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Every year, tens of thousands of people die at the hands of law enforcement 
worldwide.1 George Floyd (United States), Daniel Chibuike (Nigeria), Agatha 
Felix (Brazil), João Pedro (Brazil), Breonna Taylor (United States), Anderson 
Arboleda (Colombia), Laquan McDonald (United States), Eric Garner (United 
States), Regis Korchinski-Paquet (Canada), Silvia Maldonado (Argentina), Di-
ego Cagliero (Argentina), Yair López (Mexico), Cédric Chouviat (France), Ku-
manjayi Walker (Australia)—the ever-growing list of lives lost to law enforce-
ment reveals a dysfunction in the nature of policing that is global in scale.2 In the 
 
 1 Police Killings by Country 202 1, WORLD POPULATION REV., https://worldpopulationre-
view.com/country-rankings/police-killings-by-country (last visited June 6, 2021). 
  2 Evan Hill et al., How George Floyd was Killed in Police Custody, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floyd-investigation.html; Deji 
Lambo, Angry Youth Protest as Cop Shoots Rivers Musician Dead, PUNCH (Sept. 22, 2020), 
https://punchng.com/angry-youths-protest-as-cop-shoots-rivers-musician-dead/; Dom Phil-
lips, Brazilians Blame Rio Governor’s Shoot-To-Kill Policy for Death of Girl, GUARDIAN 
(Sept. 22, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/22/brazilians-blame-rio-gov-
ernors-shoot-to-kill-policy-for-death-of-agatha-felix-girl-8; Tom Phillips, Black Lives Shat-
tered: Outrage as Boy, 14, is Brazil Police’s Latest Victim, GUARDIAN (June 3, 2020), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/03/brazil-black-lives-police-teenager; Richard 
A. Oppel Jr. et al., What to Know About Breonna Taylor’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/article/breonna-taylor-police.html; Ana Luisa Gonzáles, How Afro-
Colombians are Standing Up Against Racial Violence, REMEZCLA (June 19, 2020), 
https://remezcla.com/features/culture/colombia-protests-black-lives-matter-racial-violence-
in-country/; Nausheen Husain, Laquan McDonald Timeline: The Shooting, the Video, the Ver-
dict and the Sentencing, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/laq 
uan-mcdonald/ct-graphics-laquan-mcdonald-officers-fired-timeline-htmlstory.html; Al Baker 
et al., Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/eric-garner-police-chokehold-staten-island.h 
tml; Mary Maillard, Regis Korchinski-Paquet (1990–2020), BLACKPAST (Mar. 28, 2021), 
https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/people-global-african-history/regis-korchin 
ski-paquet-1990-2020/; Julio Rodriguez, Tenía 17 años: Murió Silvia Maldonado, la 
adolescente que recibió un disparo policial en Santiago del Estero, POLICIALES (June 18, 
2019), https://www.clarin.com/policiales/murio-silvia-maldonado-adolescente-recibio-dispar 
o-policial-santiago-estero_0_HDLdKWBdD.html; Mauricio Centurion, Violencia policial, 
CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS LEGALES Y SOCIALES, https://violenciapolicial.org.ar/ (last visited June 
17, 2021); Mexico: Overhaul Police Forces, HUMAN RTS. WATCH (July 24, 2020), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/24/mexico-overhaul-police-forces#; Cédric Chouviat: 
French Police Charged Over Death of Delivery Driver, BBC NEWS (July 16, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53439655; Lorena Allam et al., NT Police Officer 
Zachary Rolfe Shot Kumanjayi Walker Twice at ‘Very Close’ Range, Court Told, GUARDIAN 
(Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/sep/02/nt-police-officer-
zachary-rolfe-shot-kumanjayi-walker-twice-at-very-close-range-court-told. 
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last year, demonstrators have gathered in cities—from New York to Tokyo, La-
gos to Sydney, Cape Town to Paris—demanding reforms to the way police use 
and abuse force against the communities they serve.3 
In recognition of the global dimension and relevance of this problem and 
prompted by an appeal from family members of victims of police killings, the 
U.N. Human Rights Council (HRC) held an Urgent Debate in June 2020 on “ra-
cially inspired human rights violations, systemic racism, police brutality and vi-
olence against peaceful protests.”4 Testifying before the HRC, U.N. Special Rap-
porteur on All Forms of Racism, E. Tendayi Achiume, called attention to patterns 
of “militarization of the police, and the violent crackdown against peaceful pro-
testers and journalists, in the United States,” with parallels in many parts of the 
world, as evidenced by “[t]he massive transnational public outcry” and mobili-
zation.5 The debate resulted in an HRC resolution deploring the “recent incidents 
of excessive use of force and other human rights violations by law enforcement 
officers against peaceful demonstrators defending the rights of Africans and of 
people of African descent” and calling on countries to “look into their manuals 
and guidelines used for training law enforcement officers with a view to identi-
fying the proportionality of measures in the handling of suspects and other per-
sons in custody . . . .”6   
 
 3 Damien Cave et al., Huge Crowds Around the Globe March in Solidarity Against Police 
Brutality, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/06/world/george-
floyd-global-protests.html; How the End Sars Protests Have Changed Nigeria Forever, BBC 
NEWS (Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54662986; see also Thisanka 
Siripala, Japan Holds Anti-Racism Rally, Protesting Homegrown Police Brutality in Solidarity 
with Black Lives Matter, DIPLOMAT (June 8, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/japan-
holds-anti-racism-rally-protesting-homegrown-police-brutality-in-solidarity-with-black-lives 
-matter/. 
 4 Press Release, U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights 
Council Holds an Urgent Debate on Current Racially Inspired Human Rights Violations, Sys-
temic Racism, Police Brutality and Violence Against Peaceful Protests, U.N. Press Release 
(June 17, 2020). 
 5 E. Tendayi Achiume (Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance) et al., Statement at the Urgent Debate 
of the Human Rights Council on “The Current Racially Inspired Human Rights Violations, 
Systemic Racism, Police Brutality and the Violence Against Peaceful Protest” (June 17, 2020), 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25969&LangID
=E. 
 6 Human Rights Council Res. 43/1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/43/1 (June 30, 2020). As a follow 
up to this HRC Resolution, in June 2021 the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights issued a Report stating that “States should reform laws, policies, procedures and practices to 
restrict the use of force by law enforcement officials in compliance with international principles on 
the use of force and firearms, particularly the principles of legality, precaution, necessity, propor-
tionality, accountability and non-discrimination.” See Promotion and Protection of the Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Africans and of People of African Decent Against Excessive 
Use of Force and Other Human Rights Violations by Law Enforcement Officers, ¶  41, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/47/53 (June 1, 2021), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G21/122/03/PD 
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Prior to the establishment of the international human rights system, the way 
States engaged in law enforcement in their own territories was understood as an 
entirely internal matter. The human rights system, however, was instituted to es-
tablish global standards on States’ treatment of their own citizens, thus ensuring 
minimum safeguards for every human being regardless of the government they 
happen to live under.7 The use of force by State agents against civilian popula-
tions is now understood to fall squarely within the constraints set by the human 
rights system, as expressed in its foundational agreement, the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, and enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights as well as regional human rights treaties.8 These rights in-
clude the right to life, freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment, the right to assembly and association, and the freedom from racial 
discrimination.9 
To enable and protect these rights, standards have emerged from the interna-
tional human rights system aimed at constraining how and when police may use 
lethal force against their own civilian populations. International sources, ex-
pounded in greater detail in Part III, establish that police may use lethal force 
only when it is (1) absolutely necessary as a last resort and in response to an 
immediate, particularized threat; (2) proportional to the threat or resistance 
faced, which in the case of lethal force must be a threat to life or serious bodily 
injury; (3) sanctioned by law; and (4) held meaningfully accountable through 
independent oversight and publicly accessible, transparent record-keeping. A 
State must satisfy all four principles, in addition to the general principle of non-
discrimination, to meet the minimal human rights standard for the regulation of 
lethal force by its police bodies. 
This study aims to assess whether States’ law enforcement bodies comply with 
this basic human rights standard by examining the written directives provided by 
the State to police officers. The study examines these directives, contained in 
laws and policies, in the largest cities of the twenty-nine wealthiest countries. 
Through a review of use of lethal force directives in the world’s most well-re-
sourced countries, the study aims to shed light on the state of global policing and 
long-standing concerns about State abuses of power. 
 
F/G2112203.pdf?OpenElement. 
 7 WALTER KÄLIN & JÖRG KÜNZLI, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
PROTECTION 3–146 (2d ed. 2019). 
 8 Relevant regional human rights treaties include the American Convention on Human 
Rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the European Convention on 
Human Rights. See Organization of American States, American Convention of Human Rights, 
“Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica,” Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 144; African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, “Banjul Charter,” June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 218; Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 9 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948); see also 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
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The paper proceeds as follows: Part II provides a brief background on modern 
policing; Part III sets forth the framework developed by researchers to assess 
whether the written directives reviewed comply with international human rights 
standards; Part IV details the analysis conducted and findings; and Part V con-
textualizes these findings vis-à-vis policing more generally, highlighting that 
while reform of written directives is a necessary starting point, it is only one 




As an arm of the State tasked with maintaining safety, welfare, and social or-
der, law enforcement bodies around the world hold a monopoly on the lawful use 
of lethal force against civilians, including lethal and non-lethal force.10 Law en-
forcement’s license to use force is often wide-reaching, extending from public 
spaces to the private sphere.11 Over time, the tools and techniques by which law 
enforcement bodies employ force have expanded and evolved—from batons and 
firearms, to chemical agents, semi-automatic pistols, and emerging surveillance 
technologies. 
Law enforcement’s monopoly on the lawful use of lethal force against civil-
ians is a relatively modern phenomenon. Prior to the development of contempo-
rary forms of policing in many parts of the world, decentralized and hyper-local-
ized bodies generally enforced social order.12 Although military bodies 
sometimes assisted in arrests or detentions, crime prevention and control were 
largely left to the citizens themselves and centered around norm enforcement.13 
 
 10 Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in MAX WEBER’S COMPLETE WRITINGS ON 
ACADEMIC AND POLITICAL VOCATIONS 155–57 (John Dreijmanis ed., Gordon C. Wells trans., 
2008). 
 11 Some countries have recently narrowed the role of police in providing forms of social 
services instead of law enforcement for certain situations. For instance, in 2015, Sweden began 
employing mental health professionals to replace police officers. Finland has invested re-
sources in social services for homeless people such as housing, work placement, and addiction 
counseling. Karla Adam & Rick Noack, Defund the Police? Other Countries Have Narrowed 
Their Role and Boosted Other Services, WASH. POST (June 14, 2020), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/world/europe/police-protests-countries-reforms/2020/06/13/596eab16-abf2-11e 
a-a43b-be9f6494a87d_story.html. 
 12 While other administrative bodies existed to collect taxes, protect borders, and con-
trol the military, law enforcement consisted of social order outside of these specialist 
administrative bodies and dealt more with organizing day-to-day interactions among the 
citizenry. Gerhard Sälter, Early Modern Police and Policing, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1243, 1243 (Gerben Bruinsma & David Weisburd 
eds., 2014). 
 13 Id. 
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Many modern-day policing practices, the structure of law enforcement bodies, 
and even the language of certain laws and policies that regulate policing have 
roots in the institutions of colonialism and slavery.14 In the United States, slave 
patrols and practices of settler colonialism were precursors to contemporary po-
licing structures and practices.15 The legacy of these institutions manifests in 
highly contentious contemporary debates surrounding policing worldwide and 
situates contemporary efforts to understand how and when force is used by law 
enforcement and in what ways this power is abused.16 
Today, while all States enlist their government agencies to engage in law en-
forcement, the structure of law enforcement varies significantly. Police forces in 
Australia, China, and France, among others, are centralized in a national police 
force.17 In contrast, in Nigeria, for example, national forces are organized and 
controlled at the subnational level.18 In other States, such as the United States, 
police forces are further decentralized and governed by localities. Additionally, 
most States have supplemental, specialized police forces with authority to act in 
specific situations such as during riots or protests and in the protection of 
 
 14 See, e.g., Uladzimir Dzenisevich & Maja Daruwala, The Police We Have and Where it 
Came From: An Analysis, COMMONWEALTH HUM. RTS. INITIATIVE, https://www.humanrightsi 
nitiative.org/blog/the-police-we-have-and-where-it-came-from-an-analysis (last visited Apr. 
1, 2020) (“Indian police laws are based on a British model created 155 years ago and have 
changed little. India’s current police law came into force some four years after an uprising 
against its colonial masters in 1857 that was brutally repressed. It was designed for foreign 
conquerors to rule over a native population.”). 
 15 See, e.g., CAROL A. ARCHIBOLD, THE History of the Police, Section I, in POLICING: A 
TEXT/READER 2 (2012), https://www.sagepub.com/sites/default/files/upm-binaries/50819_ch 
_1.pdf (last visited June 6, 2021). 
 16 See, e.g., Larry H. Spruill, Slave Patrols, “Packs of Negro Dogs” and Policing Black 
Communities, 53 PHYLON 42 (2016). 
 17 A centralized police force contains a hierarchical police structure that aims to ensure 
national policy is executed at the national, state, and local level. See Christian Mouhanna, 
Local Governance in the Centralized French System of Policing: From Co-production to Con-
flict of Legitimacy, 16:5 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 534 (June 2019). Australia, China, and France 
are three examples of countries that rely on a national police force. The Australian Federal 
Police (AFP) is Australia’s national police force responsible for investigating federal offenses; 
state and territorial police forces, such as the New South Wales Police Force (NSWPF), en-
force state and territory criminal law alongside the AFP. See, e.g., Kelly Buchanan, Police 
Weapons: Australia, LIBR. CONG. (2014), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/police-weapons/austr 
alia.php. The Public Security Police, the main police authority in China, operates under the 
Ministry of Public Security and is highly centralized. See, e.g., Richard H. Ward, The Police 
in China, 2 JUST. Q. 111 (1985). France relies primarily on two national police forces: the 
National Police for urban areas and the Gendarmerie Nationale for rural areas and small towns. 
See Jean-Paul Brodeur, Police: National Police Organizations, BRITANNICA, https://www.brit 
annica.com/topic/police/Police-and-counterterrorism (last visited Mar. 10, 2020) (“France . . . 
exemplif[ies] the model of high centralization with a small number of national police forces.”). 
 18 In some countries, such as Nigeria, national police forces are primarily created and 
managed by subnational government authorities. See, e.g., A.A. Egunjobi, The Nigerian Fed-
eral Practice and the Call for State Police, 2 INT’L J. ADVANCED ACAD. RES. 1, 2 (2016). 
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government buildings. These forces can be organized at the national or local level 
and assist police officers to varying degrees.19 
Regardless of their differing structures, contexts, and practices, the use of 
force as a form of coercion is a common denominator in law enforcement around 
the world. As a former law enforcement official-turned-use of force researcher 
described it, law enforcement officers are the “conduit of [S]tate power,” “the 
mechanism through which that power is expressed.”20 Governments around the 
world allow law enforcement officers to deploy this power as a form of coercion 
against individuals in the service of State interests and in compliance with the 
law.21 However, as this study demonstrates, the limits and contours of this au-








 19 For example, Spain’s two national police forces—Policia Nacional and Guardia Civil—
perform wholly separate functions from the municipal police but can assist during protests or 
riots. See Funciones: Guardia Civil, MINISTERIO DE INTERIOR, https://www.guardi-
acivil.es/es/institucional/Conocenos/especialidades/index.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2021). In 
other cases, multiple local forces exist. For example, in São Paulo, Brazil, everyday policing 
is governed at the state level and is shared between the Civil Police (investigators) and the 
Military Police (foot patrol officers); however, some localities have municipal forces, called 
Guardas Civis, which carry firearms and whose powers have become increasingly aligned with 
those of the Military Police. See In São Paulo, GCM Increasingly Assumes the Role of the 
Military Police, CARTACAPITAL (May 29, 2017), https://www.cartacapital.com.br/socie-
dade/em-sao-paulo-a-gcm-assume-cada-vez-mais-o-papel-de-pm/. 
 20 Anna Sale, Death, Sex & Money: I Killed Someone. Now I Study Police Violence, 
WNYC STUDIOS (Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/deathsexmoney/epi 
sodes/police-shooting-death-sex-money. 
 21 See Robert J. Friedrich, Police Use of Force: Individuals, Situations, and Organiza-
tions, 452 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 82, 83 (1980) (citing ALBERT J. REISS, JR., 
THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC 154 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971) (the state 
possesses a “monopoly on the legitimate use of force over civilians”)); see also Sébastien 
Cojean et al., Psychological and Sociological Factors Influencing Police Officers’ Decisions 
to Use Force: A Systematic Literature Review, 70 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 1 (2020) (“The 
police must . . . be allowed to use force, within the limits laid down by the law, in order to 
maintain the safety of citizens.”). In fact, many laws that regulate the police focus specifically 
on use of force or firearms rather than crime prevention and detection. See, e.g., Ley Nacional 
Sobre el Uso de La Fuerza [LNUF] [National Law on the Use of Force], Diario Oficial de la 
Federacion [DOF] 27-05-2019 (Mex.) [hereinafter National Law on the use of Force (Mex.)]; 
see also Gesetz über den unmittelbarn Zwang bei Ausübung öffentlicher Gewalt durch 
Vollzugsbeamte des Bundes [UZwG] [Law on Immediate Coercion in the Exercise of Official 
Authority by Federal Law Enforcement Officers], Mar. 10, 1961, BGBL (Ger.), 
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/uzwg/BJNR001650961.html. 
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III. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK AND 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Limits on the authority to use lethal force are articulated in use of lethal force 
directives. These directives are often codified in legislation22 or established by 
jurisprudence,23 and in some cases are included in a country’s constitution.24 
More detailed grounds and guidance for police use of force are also frequently 
found in executive decrees, administrative regulations and ordinances, and indi-
vidual police department policies.25 Departmental policies tend to provide the 
most practical guidance to police officers on how and to what extent police may 
use force.26 
This study grades a global selection of use of lethal force directives in terms 
of their conformity with an international human rights framework articulated in 
more detail below.27 Specifically, the study looks at police use of force laws and 
 
 22 Some States have a general policing law, such as Turkey’s Law on the Duties and Pow-
ers of the Police. Polis Vasife ve Salâhiyet Kanunu [Law No. 2559], April 7, 1943, art. 16 
(Turk.) [hereinafter Turkish Police Duty and Situation Law]. 
 23 For example, States that are members of the European Convention on Human Rights 
are bound by the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights in addition to their own State 
law regarding police use of force. In most cases, the European Court of Human Rights case 
law is more restrictive regarding police use of lethal force than individual State law. See Tou-
bache v. France, App. No. 19510/15 (June 9, 2018), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-
press#{%22itemid%22:[%22003-6108815-7881303%22]}; see generally Jim Murdoch & 
Ralph Roche, European Convention on Human Rights and Policing: A Handbook for Police 
Officers and Other Law Enforcement Officials (2015), COUNCIL EUROPE, 
https://book.coe.int/en/human-rights-and-democracy/6839-the-european-convention-on-hum 
an-rights-and-policing.html. 
 24 See e.g., Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası [Constitution of the Republic of Turkey] 1982, 
art. 17 (Turk.). 
 25 See e.g., N.Y. Police Dep’t, Patrol Guide Procedure No: 221-04(20); Acuerdo 90/2017 
Por el Que se Expide Protocolo de Actuación Policial de la Secretaría de Seguridad Pública 
de la Ciuidad de Mexico en materia de Justicia Civica [Agreement 90/2017 Police Action 
Protocol of the Ministry of Public Security in matters of Civil Justice], Gaceta Oficial de la 
Ciudad de Mexico [GO], 18-12-2017 (Mex.). 
 26 For example, national legislation in the United Kingdom provides general principles for 
police use of force, but the main guidance on when a London officer may use his or her firearm 
or other forms of lethal force is contained in various national policies published by the College 
of Policing and the Metropolitan Police Service Police Officer Professional Standards policy. 
See COLL. OF POLICING, CODE OF PRACTICE ON ARMED POLICING AND POLICE USE OF LESS 
LETHAL WEAPONS (2020); see also METRO. POLICE SERV., POLICE OFFICER PROFESSIONAL 
STANDARDS (2011). 
 27 “Deadly force” or “lethal force” in this study refers to physical force (the use of body 
irritants, instruments, special equipment, or firearms) to potentially or intentionally inflict 
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policies28 in the largest cities by population of the twenty-nine wealthiest coun-
tries in the world.29 This sample comprises the wealthiest nations by gross do-
mestic product (GDP)—the United States, China, Japan, Germany, India, the 
United Kingdom, France, Brazil, Italy, Canada, Russia, South Korea, Australia, 
Spain, Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, 
Argentina, Sweden, Poland, Belgium, Thailand, Iran, Austria, Norway, and Ni-
geria. The United Arab Emirates is ranked by Worldometer twenty-ninth among 
countries with the largest GDPs and was included in the original data set for this 
study.30 However, it was eliminated due to the lack of publicly available infor-
mation on the relevant laws and policies. 
Each city’s (or, where applicable, country’s) set of laws and policies was then 
graded on a 100-point scale using the framework discussed below, composed of 
four international human rights principles on police use of force: legality, neces-
sity, proportionality, and accountability.31 The elements for each principle were 
derived primarily from three authoritative international sources—the U.N. Code 
 
serious bodily injury or death. In addition, this study presupposes that “deadly force” is present 
whenever a firearm is discharged, regardless of the outcome or whether the shooter intended 
to inflict a lethal injury on the subject. Accordingly, the researchers considered both laws and 
policies that govern the use of firearms and those that govern deadly force more broadly as 
policies governing the use of deadly force. 
 28 For each country, the researchers first looked at the Law on Police Use of Force World-
wide database for an overview of the applicable police use of force laws and policies. The 
researchers then used various sources to gain an understanding of the structure of the police 
forces in each country, including government websites, academic articles, the U.S. Library of 
Congress, and country experts. Next, the researchers identified the use of lethal force direc-
tives for the police forces operating in each country’s most populous city, as determined by 
World Population Review (based on data collected by the United Nations). The use of lethal 
force directives included legislative acts, policies, codes, manuals, decrees, operational guid-
ance, regulations, circulars, standard operating procedures, executive orders, public orders, 
and other documents issued by the relevant ministry or directorate at national and city levels. 
Where the directives were in English, French, Spanish, Mandarin, or Cantonese, researchers 
reviewed them in their original languages. Where directives were in other languages, research-
ers relied on official and unofficial translations. To ensure the right laws and policies were 
identified and correctly interpreted, researchers communicated with attorneys, academics, or 
policing experts in each country, as needed. 
 29 GDP by Country, WORLDOMETER (2017), https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/gdp-by-
country/. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Each jurisdiction received a cumulative grade based on its rules on police use of force, 
whether these rules derived solely from law, solely from policy, or from a combination of the 
two. Where a country had regulations or policies providing more detailed guidance for police 
on the use of deadly force, these documents were used as the basis of the country’s grade. The 
majority of the countries reviewed fell into this category. In limited circumstances, where a 
country only had legislation governing police use of deadly force, the country was allocated a 
grade based on that legislation. In rarer instances, when a country had legislation that provided 
partial guidance to police officers and policies that completed that guidance, the researchers 
took both instruments into account. 
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of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials,32 the U.N. Basic Principles on the 
Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials,33 and the 2014 Annual 
Report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions.34 This framework and its component principles were used to deter-
mine whether the largest cities in each state meet the basic standards set by the 
international human rights system. 
 
A. The Principles 
 
Legality: Under the legality principle, police use of lethal force policies must 
be based on a law that authorizes but clearly limits police use of deadly force in 
accordance with international human rights standards. As stated in the U.N. 
Special Rapporteur’s 2014 report: 
For the use of lethal force not to be arbitrary there must, in the 
first place, be a sufficient legal basis. This requirement is not met 
if lethal force is used without the authority being provided for in 
domestic law, or if it is based on a domestic law that does not 
comply with international standards.35 
The existence of legislation authorizing police to use deadly force confers le-
gitimacy on other written directives and facilitates accountability by clarifying 
 
 32 The United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials is a United Na-
tions General Assembly resolution that was adopted in December of 1979. G.A. Res. 34/169, 
Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (Dec. 17, 1979) [hereinafter Code of Con-
duct]. 
 33 The Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, 
adopted by the U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders and 
acknowledged by the U.N. General Assembly in resolution 45/166 in 1990, elaborate on and 
clarify the standards set forth in the Code of Conduct. Eighth Congress on the Prevention of 
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by 
Law Enforcement Officials, ¶ 4 (Sept. 7, 1990), https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/ 
basic-principles-on-the-use-of-force-and-firearms-by-law-enforcement-officials/ [hereinafter 
Basic Principles]. 
 34 The 2014 Annual Report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions to the Human Rights Council expounds on the content of the four stand-
ards in light of broader human rights principles, including the right to life and the right to 
peaceful assembly. This report draws from international treaties and judicial decisions to clar-
ify standards related to oversight and accountability. Christof Heyns (Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extraju-
dicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/36 (Apr. 1, 2014), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session26/Pages/ListReports.as 
px [hereinafter 2014 UNSR Report]. 
 35 See id. ¶ 56. 
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when the use of force violates legislatively imposed limits. An appropriate legal 
framework must clearly define and limit the circumstances in which police of-
ficers may use lethal force, limiting discretion to circumstances where force is 
absolutely necessary to protect life. A law that sets unclear or broad standards 
risks allowing arbitrary and disproportionate use of force.   
Necessity: In order to preserve the right to life, the ability to use lethal force 
is narrowly confined to defensive situations in which lethal force is the only 
method available, and therefore necessary, to avoid an imminent threat of death 
or serious injury to the officer or a third person. Accordingly, the principle of 
necessity permits the use of lethal force only in response to an imminent and 
particularized threat, and only as a last resort.36 
The first element of necessity—immediacy—derives from the U.N. Basic 
Principles37 and is further elaborated in the U.N. Special Rapporteur’s 2014 re-
port, which states that “force may also only be used in response to an imminent 
or immediate threat—a matter of seconds, not hours.”38 The second element—
particularized threat—underscores that lethal force may only be used in response 
to a specific, not simply a generalized, heightened risk or threat.39 The U.N. Basic 
Principles define a heightened risk as one of “death or serious injury,” which 
implies that the threat must be to persons and not objects.40 The third element of 
the necessity principle—last resort—stipulates that lethal force must not be used 
until after other non-lethal options have been considered or “whenever the lawful 
use of force and firearms is unavoidable.”41 
Proportionality: The principle of proportionality applies to all use of force 
by police, not just lethal force.42 As applied to lethal force, the U.N. Special 
 
 36 Article 3 of the U.N. Code of Conduct provides that law enforcement officials “may 
use force only when strictly necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their 
duty.” Code of Conduct, supra note 32, at art. 3. The Basic Principles, at special provision 9, 
further explain that “intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly una-
voidable in order to protect life.” Basic Principles, supra note 33, at ¶ 9. 
 37 The Basic Principles, at special provision 9, provide that firearms may only be used “in 
self-defence or defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury . . . .” 
Basic Principles, supra note 33, at ¶ 9. 
 38 2014 UNSR Report, supra note 34, at ¶ 59. 
 39 See UNIV. CHI. LAW SCH., GLOB. HUM. RTS. CLINIC, DEADLY DISCRETION: THE FAILURE 
OF POLICE USE OF FORCE POLICIES TO MEET FUNDAMENTAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW AND STANDARDS (2020), https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/ihrc/14 [hereinafter 
DEADLY DISCRETION]; see also Code of Conduct, supra note 32, at art. 3, cmt. (c); Basic Prin-
ciples, supra note 33, at ¶ 9. 
 40 Basic Principles, supra note 33, at ¶ 9. 
 41 Id. at ¶ 5; see Code of Conduct, supra note 32, at art. 3, cmt. (c); see also Basic Princi-
ples, supra note 33, at ¶ 4 (police “may use force and firearms only if other means remain 
ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended result”). The 2014 UNSR Report 
explains that “force should be the last resort . . . , and if it is needed, graduated force (the 
minimum required) should be applied.” 2014 UNSR Report, supra note 34, at ¶ 59. 
 42 2014 UNSR Report, supra note 34, at ¶ 70. 
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Rapporteur’s 2014 report describes the value underlying proportionality as the 
“protect life” precept: “a life may be taken intentionally only to save another 
life.”43 The U.N. Code of Conduct, at Article 3, commentary (c), notes that lethal 
force should only be used when a subject “offers armed resistance or otherwise 
jeopardizes the lives of others.”44 The U.N. Basic Principles, at special provision 
9, expand the principle to allow use of firearms in response to threats of “serious 
injury,” which may be referred to as a threat of serious bodily harm.45 Taking 
these sources together, the principle of proportionality permits use of lethal force 
by police only when they are facing a threat of death or serious bodily harm to 
themselves or a third person. 
Accountability: Compliance with the accountability principle ensures that po-
lice officers are not above the law and are held responsible for any transgressions 
of use of force policies.46 The U.N. Code of Conduct establishes that, “[i]n every 
instance in which a firearm is discharged, a report should be made promptly to 
the competent authorities.”47 The U.N. Basic Principles require “a system of re-
porting whenever law enforcement officials use firearms in the performance of 
their duty.”48 The Principles further call for an “effective review process,” with 
“independent administrative or prosecutorial authorities” in a position to exercise 
jurisdiction, and, in cases of death or serious injury, the submission of a prompt, 
detailed report to the “authorities responsible for administrative review and judi-
cial control.”49 The U.N. Special Rapporteur goes further and requires involve-
ment of an external oversight body with “necessary powers, resources, independ-
ence, transparency[,] . . . community and political support, and civil society 
involvement.”50 As these sources clearly indicate, meaningful accountability is 
key. Thus, the principle of accountability applied in this study requires reporting 
and an investigation each time lethal force is used, regardless of the outcome, 
and oversight by an external independent mechanism. 
Non-discrimination: A fifth principle, non-discrimination, requires each 
State and its law enforcement sector to ensure every person equal enjoyment of 
all rights, including life and security.51 As with other human rights protections, 
 
 43 Id. 
 44 See, e.g., Code of Conduct, supra note 32, at art. 3, cmt. (c). 
 45 Basic Principles, supra note 33, at ¶ 9. 
 46 See 2014 UNSR Report, supra note 34, at ¶ 100. 
 47 Code of Conduct, supra note 32, at art. 3, cmt. (c). 
 48 Basic Principles, supra note 33, at ¶ 11(f). 
 49 Id. at ¶ 22. 
 50 2014 UNSR Report, supra note 34, at ¶ 84. 
 51 The non-discrimination principle has been consistently articulated as foundational in all 
instruments that provide guidance on the human rights standards on use of lethal force by law 
enforcement. 2014 UNSR Report, supra note 34, at ¶ 74 (“[P]olice exercise higher levels of 
violence against certain groups of people, based on institutionalized racism or ethnic discrim-
ination. Discrimination on these, and other, grounds also impacts on patterns of accountability. 
States must instead adopt both a reactive and a proactive stance, encompassing all available 
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non-discrimination provides context for the four principles on lethal use of 
force.52 Equal treatment is one of the core reasons States must limit police dis-
cretion and ensure effective accountability processes. However, the principle of 
non-discrimination was not included in this study’s grading framework because 
our analysis is limited to use of lethal force directives. Non-discrimination re-
quirements are not articulated in lethal force directives, but rather, primarily, in 
constitutions and often in more broad-based legislation. In accordance with these 
constitutional and legislative imperatives, police departments should explicitly 
articulate and implement nondiscriminatory policing in their policies and train-
ing. 
 
B. Grading Scale53 
 
The grading system in this study assesses the language in the use of lethal 
force directives applicable to each city (referred to as jurisdiction) for its com-
pliance with the principles of proportionality, necessity, legality, and accounta-
bility. As noted above, the applicable directives to a particular city vary by State. 
Depending on the city, the directives that apply to law enforcement could be local 
or national in scope and contained in legislation, administrative regulations, or 
internal departmental policy. The points awarded to these directives are refer-
enced below. 
Legality (twenty points): The legality principle requires States to provide a 
legal foundation for any use of lethal force directives.54 The jurisdictions in this 
study that fully complied with the legality principle were awarded twenty points. 
The legality principle was awarded fewer points than the other principles be-
cause, while a legislative foundation is important, it is often supplemented with 
other written directives. Thus, the point value reflects the reality that human 
rights-compliant instructions can be delivered to the police through various le-
gitimate means. 
 
means, to combat racially motivated and other similar violence within law enforcement oper-
ations.”); Code of Conduct, supra note 32, at article 2. 
 52 See generally Terry D. Johnson, Unbridled Discretion and Color Consciousness: Vio-
lating International Human Rights in the United States Criminal Justice System, 56 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 231 (2003); see also 2014 UNSR Report, supra note 34, at ¶ 74; Code of Conduct, 
supra note 32, at art. 2, cmt. (a). 
 53 The grading scale was adapted from the methodology used to evaluate U.S. cities in a 
report created by the Global Human Rights Clinic at the University of Chicago Law School. 
The researchers used the same grading system to analyze the compliance with international 
human rights standards of police department lethal use of force policies in the twenty largest 
cities by population in the United States. See DEADLY DISCRETION, supra note 39. 
 54 See DEADLY DISCRETION, supra note 39, at page 13; see also Code of Conduct, supra 
note 32, at art. 3, cmt. (b). 
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The researchers adjusted the grading applied in Deadly Discretion to account 
for variation in legal and policy frameworks in different countries based on the 
following scale:  
 
• If there was no law limiting the use of force, the jurisdiction received 
zero points. 
• Where a policy existed but was not based on a law, the jurisdiction 
received zero points. 
• Where a policy existed and was based on a law but the law was not 
compliant with international human rights standards, the jurisdiction 
received five points. 
• Where a policy existed and was based on law that was compliant with 
international human rights standards, the jurisdiction received the full 
twenty points. 
• Where a national or subnational law was the sole instrument regulat-
ing police use of lethal force, and no separate policy existed, a juris-
diction received five points if the law was not compliant with inter-
national human rights standards; the jurisdiction received the full 
twenty points if its law was compliant with international standards.55 
 
Necessity (thirty points): Necessity permits the use of lethal force only as a 
last resort in response to an immediate and particularized threat.56 All three ele-
ments of necessity must have been present for a jurisdiction to receive all thirty 
points. Points were awarded if either the law or the policy, or both, complied 
with the necessity elements. Necessity was assigned thirty points because it (1) 
represents a set of explicit limitations on police use of lethal force; and (2) in-
cludes three distinct, but equally important, sub-elements deriving from the in-
ternational human rights standard: 
 
• Immediacy (ten points): A law or policy that allowed use of deadly 
force only when a subject presents an immediate or imminent threat 
satisfied the immediacy element and received the full ten points. A 
law or policy that generally required immediacy for the use of deadly 
force, but which contained an exception that allows the use of deadly 
force in certain circumstances, such as against a fleeing felon or flee-
ing suspect, without requiring that the threat posed by the subject be 
immediate or imminent, received five points. 
 
 55 This represents an adjustment to the grading applied in DEADLY DISCRETION to account 
for variation in legal and policy frameworks in different countries. 
 56 See DEADLY DISCRETION, supra note 39, at page 14; see also Code of Conduct, supra 
note 32, at art. 3, cmt. (c); Basic Principles, supra note 33, at ¶ 9. 
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• Particularized Threat (ten points): A law or policy that allowed the 
use of deadly force only in response to a specific and heightened risk 
or threat satisfied the particularized threat element and received ten 
points. To satisfy this principle, the specific and heightened risk or 
threat must be to people rather than property.57 
• Last Resort (ten points): A law or policy that allowed the use of 
deadly force only after non-deadly options had been considered or 
where the use of force was otherwise unavoidable, satisfied the last 
resort element and received all ten points. If a law or policy used the 
term “last resort” or equivalent phrasing, the element was satisfied. If 
a law or policy set out a continuum of force and required de-escala-
tion or the use of other non-violent methods before the use of deadly 
force, the last resort element was satisfied. Where a policy or law only 
required that a warning shot be fired prior to direct use of deadly 
force, the last resort element was not satisfied because it failed to re-
quire sufficient efforts of de-escalation. 
 
Proportionality (twenty-five points): A law or policy that allowed the use of 
deadly force only in response to an equal threat of death or serious bodily injury 
to the officer or other people satisfied the proportionality principle and received 
all twenty-five points. Mere reference to a requirement that the use of lethal force 
be “proportional” was insufficient; the relevant law or policy must have clearly 
established that only a threat of death or serious bodily injury justified police use 
of lethal force. 
Accountability (twenty-five points): A law or policy that required law en-
forcement to issue a full report to an independent, external oversight body for 
each instance lethal force is used—regardless of the outcome—received the full 
twenty-five points. A jurisdiction was awarded points if either the law or the 
policy, or both, complied with the accountability sub-elements. The accountabil-
ity principle is organized into five sub-elements to provide increasing and aggre-
gative points based on the international standards and to reflect observed differ-
ences in the policies studied. These sub-elements derive from two distinctions: 
(1) internal versus external contact or reporting procedures;58 and (2) procedures 
triggered for all instances of the use of deadly force—i.e., each time an officer 
discharges a firearm, regardless of the outcome––versus those triggered only for 
 
 57 The Basic Principles, at special provision 9, define a heightened risk as one of “death 
or serious injury.” Basic Principles, supra note 33, at ¶ 9. 
 58 “Contact” comprises notification procedures whereby law enforcement makes contact 
and notifies an external body when an officer has used deadly force without providing sub-
stantial information about the incident. “Reporting,” on the other hand, requires law enforce-
ment to issue a full report detailing what happened during the incident involving the use of 
deadly force to an external body. See DEADLY DISCRETION, supra note 39, at page 32. 
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instances that result in death or serious bodily injury. The five accountability sub-
elements that were aggregated in the total score awarded are as follows: 
 
• Mandatory internal reporting when death or injury occurs: A law or 
policy that required internal reporting only when death or injury re-
sults from the use of deadly force received zero points. Similarly, 
where a law or policy made vague reference to reporting obligations 
to “competent authorities,” without specifying whether those author-
ities are internal or external to the police force, it received zero points.   
• Mandatory internal reporting for all instances of deadly force: A law 
or policy that required internal reporting for all instances of the use 
of deadly force, regardless of the outcome, received five points. 
• Mandatory external contact when death or injury occurs: A law or 
policy that required external contact only when death or injury results 
from the use of deadly force received five points. 
• Mandatory external contact for all instances of deadly force: A law 
or policy that mandated external contact for all instances of the use of 
deadly force, regardless of the outcome, received seven points. 
• Mandatory external reporting when death or injury occurs: A law or 
policy that required external reporting only when death or injury re-
sults from police use of deadly force received eight points. 
• Mandatory external reporting for all instances of deadly force: A law 
or policy that mandated external reporting for all instances of the use 
of deadly force, regardless of the outcome, received twenty-five 
points. 
 
IV. ANALYSIS OF USE OF FORCE LAWS AND POLICIES 
 
A. Applying the Human Rights Framework 
 
Our analysis shows that not one jurisdiction analyzed complied fully with the 
four principles of legality, necessity, proportionality, and accountability. As the 
subsequent sections will detail, every jurisdiction fell short on the principle of 
legality by failing to provide a proper legal foundation for use of force directives.  
Nineteen out of the twenty-nine jurisdictions analyzed failed the three other prin-
ciples—necessity, proportionality, and accountability. Amsterdam, Brussels, and 
Stockholm, for example, were the only jurisdictions to satisfy the accountability 
principle by requiring external independent reporting for every use of lethal force 
by a police officer. Rome, Mumbai, and Paris received zero points for necessity, 
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proportionality, and accountability and only partially satisfied the principle of 
legality. Riyadh was unique for receiving zero points under each principle, fail-
ing entirely to comply with basic human rights standards on the use of lethal 
force by police.   










The principle of legality requires that legislation define and limit the circum-
stances in which police officers may use lethal force. Failing to establish these 
limits in domestic legislation opens the door to abuse of discretion and frustrates 
accountability for such abuses.59 As explained by the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in its ‘Handbook on police accountability, oversight 
and integrity,’ policies must be “based on the legislation that reflect both the 
spirit and the letter of the law.”60 When limits on use of lethal force do not have 
the force of law, efforts to hold police officers accountable for abuses of discre-
tion are undermined.   
None of the jurisdictions evaluated satisfied the principle of legality. In other 
words, none of the twenty-nine wealthiest countries in the world have a law that 
sets human rights compliant limits on when police may use lethal force. Twenty-
 
 59 As the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions wrote in 
his report to the Human Rights Council, 
[f]or the use of lethal force not to be arbitrary there must, in the first place, 
be a sufficient legal basis. This requirement is not met if lethal force is used 
without the authority being provided for in domestic law, or if it is based on 
a domestic law that does not comply with international standards. 
2014 UNSR Report, supra note 34, at ¶ 56. 
 60 U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, HANDBOOK ON POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY, OVERSIGHT 
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eight jurisdictions received five points for having laws that were non-compliant. 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, was the only jurisdiction to receive zero points for legal-
ity. The law governing police in Riyadh fails to set any standards on use of force61 
and there are no policies in Riyadh that supplement and reference an existing 
legal framework.62  
For example, Berlin has a law governing police that sets out standards for the 
use of force, including specific rules for the use of firearms.63 The law provides 
that “[a] law enforcement officer may shoot at individuals in order to prevent 
them from the imminent execution or continuation of an illegal act which, under 
the circumstances, turns out to be (a) a crime or (b) an offense involving the use 
or carrying of firearms or explosives.”64 Policy implementing the law and further 
directing police behavior mirrors the legislative language.65 The law and policy 
fail to satisfy the necessity and proportionality principles, both of which require 
lethal force only be used in response to an immediate threat of death or serious 
bodily harm (rather than the commission of any crime). Therefore, Berlin re-
ceived five points for having a policy that mirrored a non-compliant law.  
Like Berlin, where the legally-grounded policy failed to satisfy one or more 
of the other principles of the grading framework, the other twenty-eight jurisdic-
tions reviewed did not fully satisfy the principle of legality.66 Law 5688 Integral 
 
 61 Law of Criminal Procedure, Royal Decree No. M/39 (Oct. 16, 2001) (Saudi Arabia); 
Basic Law of Governance, Royal Decree No. A/90 (Mar. 1, 1992) (Saudi Arabia). 
 62 See, e.g., Saudi Arabia, LAW ON POLICE USE FORCE WORLDWIDE, https://www.policingl 
aw.info/country/saudi-arabia (last visited Mar. 10, 2021). 
 63 Gesetz über die Anwendung unmittelbaren Zwanges bei der Ausübung öffentlicher 
Gewalt durch Vollzugsbeamte des Landes Berlin (UZwG Bln) [Law on the Application of 
Immediate Coercion in the Exercise of Official Authority by Law Enforcement Officers of the 
State of Berlin], June 22, 1970, BERLIN GESETZ- UND VERORDNUNGSBLATT [BER GVBL] (Ber-
lin) (Ger.). 
 64 Id. § 11. 
 65 Ausführungsvorschriften für Vollzugsdienstkräfte der Polizeibehörde zum UZwG Bln 
[AV Pol UZwG Bln] [Implementing Regulations for Enforcement Officers of the Police Au-
thority to the UZwG Bln], June 20, 2016 (Ger.). 
 66 See Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) pt 18 (Austl.) 
[hereinafter Austl. Act] (using broad and vague standards); GESAMTE RECHTSVORSCHRIFT FÜR 
WAFFENGEBRACUHSGESETZ (WAFFENGEBRAUCHSEGETZ) [WEAPON USE ACT] [hereinafter 
AUSTRIA WEAPONS USE ACT], Mar. 27, 1969, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBl] No. 149/1969 
(Austria), as amended, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/; Loi sur la fonction de police [Law on the 
police function], Aug. 5, 1992, Interieur Fonction Publique Justice, Dec. 12, 1992, 27124, art. 
37–38 (Belg.); Law on the Use of Weapons by Armed Forces Officers in Necessary Cases of 
18 October 1994 (Iran) [hereinafter Iran Weapons Law]; C.p. 25 agosto 2017, n.103, arts. 52–
53, G.U. Oct. 26, 1930, n.251 (It.); USTAWA O ŚRODKACH PRZYMUSU BEZPOŚREDNIEGO I BRONI 
PALNEJ [LAW ON MEASURES OF DIRECT COERCION AND FIREARMS] 201 Pos. 628 (Pol.); Fed-
eral’nyy Zakon O Politsii [Federal Law about the Police] [SZ RF] [2011 Police Law] 2011, 
No. 3-FZ, chs. 1 & 5 (Russ.); Organic Law 2/1986, of March 13, on Security Forces and Bod-
ies (B.O.E. 1986, 63) (Spain); Law 4/1992, of July 8, on the Coordination of Local Police 
(B.O.E. 1992, 172) (Spain); 10 § POLISLAG (Polislag 1984:387) (Swed.) [hereinafter SWEDISH 
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System of Public Security of Buenos Aires, for example, failed to comply with 
the accountability principle.67 Article 96 requires that “reports be issued when 
someone is killed or injured as a result of an officer’s use of a firearm.”68 The 
accountability principle requires external independent reporting with each use of 
lethal force, regardless of whether someone is killed or injured. In these and 
many other examples, the jurisdictions failed to provide clear, legally-mandated 
limits on police discretion in accordance with human rights principles.  
 
ii. Necessity  
 
 
Only five jurisdictions (Buenos Aires, Jakarta, Lagos, Mexico City, and New 
York City) met all three elements of the necessity principle—immediacy, partic-
ularized threat, and last resort. This means twenty-four jurisdictions—more than 
80% of those studied—failed to restrict police use of deadly force to situations 
where it is necessary, as a last resort, to avoid an imminent and particularized 
threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or another person.69 Such 
 
POLICE ACT]; POLIZEIGESETZ [POLG] Apr. 23, 2007, S.G.S 550.1 (Switz.) [hereinafter Swiss 
Police Act]; Politiewet 2012, Stb. 2012, 315 at art. 7 (Neth.); Turkish Police Duty and Situa-
tion Law, supra note 22; Criminal Law Act 1967, ch. 58, § 3, (Eng.); N.Y. PENAL § 35.30 
(McKinney 2004). 
 67 See also National Law on the use of Force (Mex.), supra note 21. 
 68 Law No. 5688, Nov. 17, 2016, 5030 B.O. 50, art. 96 (Arg.). 
 69 See supra Figure 3. The twenty-four jurisdictions are: Amsterdam, Bangkok, Berlin, 
Brussels, Istanbul, London, Madrid, Moscow, Mumbai, Oslo, Paris, Riyadh, Rome, São Paulo, 





















































































































Necessity Grades by Element
Immediacy (10) Particularized Threat (10) Last Resort (10)
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restrictions are critical to provide explicit limitations on when police may use 
lethal force and to ensure protection for the right to life during law enforcement. 
Three jurisdictions (Istanbul, London, and Toronto) failed to satisfy the full ne-
cessity principle, but met two of the three elements. Fourteen jurisdictions only 
met one element or one element plus part of immediacy, as explained below.70 
One jurisdiction, Zurich, only met part of immediacy. Six jurisdictions (Mumbai, 
Moscow, Paris, Riyadh, Rome, and Shanghai)—more than 20% of the jurisdic-





Jurisdictions that satisfied the immediacy requirement and received ten points 
had directives that clearly restricted police use of deadly force to situations where 
there was an immediate or imminent threat to life or serious bodily injury. For 
example, Mexico City’s policy limits deadly force to situations where a subject 
poses “real, actual, or imminent aggression without regard to life.”71 Similarly, 
the Nigeria Police Force Order 237, which regulates the use of firearms and other 
deadly force throughout Nigeria, including in Lagos,72 enumerates five scenarios 
 
 70 See supra Figure 3. The fourteen jurisdictions are: Amsterdam, Bangkok, Berlin, Brus-
sels, Madrid, Oslo, São Paulo, Seoul, Stockholm, Sydney, Tehran, Tokyo, Vienna, and War-
saw. 
 71 Administración Pública de la Ciudad de México, [Mexico City Agreement 3/2016 on 
Arrests] [GO], 5 de Abril de 2016, art. 5.2 (Mex.). 
 72 Nigeria Police Force Order 237 (rev.), Manual of Guidance on the Use of Force & Fire-
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in which the police may use firearms, other lethal force, or potentially lethal 
force: in self-defense, in defense of another person, to disperse violent assem-
blies, to catch someone escaping custody, or to catch someone escaping arrest.73 
The Order further requires that each scenario involve an imminent threat of death 
or serious injury to the officer or others.74 The Order also provides a detailed 
definition of “imminent threat” to comprise “threatened actions or outcomes . . . 
which could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious bodily harm im-
mediately or before the imminence of such a threat can be eliminated by the po-
lice . . . .”75 Finally, the Order clarifies, in line with the 2014 Special Rapporteur 
report,76 that the actual length of time involved depends on the circumstances of 
each particular situation, but must involve “some degree of immediacy, i.e., a 
matter of seconds, not hours.”77 Together, these provisions satisfied the immedi-
acy element of the necessity principle. 
The directives in four jurisdictions (Berlin, Tokyo, Madrid, and Zurich) al-
lowed police to use deadly force to prevent an escape without regard to whether 
the threat posed by the fleeing suspect or felon was imminent.78 These jurisdic-
tions received only five points because, although their policies generally required 
immediacy, they contained “fleeing felons” exceptions that expanded police dis-
cretion impermissibly. For example, among other situations, the police in Zurich 
may use a firearm without any consideration for whether the threat they confront 
is imminent “if a person has committed a serious crime or a serious offence or is 
strongly suspected of such a crime or offence and wants to flee.”79 By contrast, 
the policies governing police use of deadly force in both Jakarta and New York 
City, like in Nigeria, required immediacy in all situations, including provisions 
that explicitly required fleeing subjects to pose an imminent threat to life or of 
serious bodily injury.80  
 
 73 Id. § 2(K)(2.1). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. § 1(B)(1.13). 
 76 See 2014 UNSR Report, supra note 34, at ¶ 59 (establishing that “force may also only 
be used in response to an imminent or immediate threat—a matter of seconds, not hours”). 
 77 Nigeria Police Order, supra note 72, § 1(B)(1.13). 
 78 See Swiss Police Act, supra note 66; Principios Básicos de Actuación Policial. Especial 
Referencia al Uso del Arma de Fuero por la Policía., SEGURIDAD PUBLICA (Oct. 1, 2010), 
https://seguridadpublica.es/2010/10/01/principios-basicos-de-actuacion-policial-especial-ref-
erencia-al-uso-del-arma-de-fuero-por-la-policia/ (Spain); The Police Duties Execution Act, 
Law No. 136 of 1948 (Japan); Law on Immediate Coercion in the Exercise of Official Author-
ity by Federal Law Enforcement Officers, supra note 21. 
 79 Polizeigesetz (PolG) [Police Act], Apr. 23, 2007, SR 550.1, art. 3, § 17(b) (Switz.). 
 80 Peraturan Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia Nomor 1 [Regulation of the Chief of 
the Indonesian National Police Number 1], The Use of Force in Police Action, art. 8 (2009) 
(Indon.). In Jakarta, the police are permitted to use a firearm or other deadly force when a 
“perpetrator or suspect can act immediately causing serious injury or death” or to prevent the 
subject from escaping when their escape “constitutes an immediate threat to the life of mem-
bers of the National Police or Public.” Id.; NEW YORK, NY, CITY OF NEW YORK PATROL GUIDE 
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Nineteen jurisdictions—more than 60% of those studied—received zero 
points because they allow police to use deadly force without concern for whether 
the threat they face is immediate or imminent.81 Without an immediacy require-
ment, police may use lethal force where non-lethal force could effectively neu-
tralize the threat posed, thus threatening the right to life. For example, the policy 
governing police use of lethal force in Paris does not require officers to consider 
whether the threat they face is imminent.82 In Sydney, law and policy provide a 
great deal of discretion for police use of lethal force, without any reference to the 
immediacy of the threat confronted.83 The police in Sydney may generally use 
force that is “reasonable and appropriate based upon the level of resistance met 
or the threat presented,”84 with further instruction “to use such force as is reason-
ably necessary to exercise the function.”85 This language, again, provides the 
police broad discretion without a temporal requirement for the threat faced. 
 
 
203–12, “DEADLY PHYSICAL FORCE” (Aug. 1, 2013) [hereinafter NYC FORCE PATROL GUIDE]. 
In New York City, police officers “shall not discharge their firearms to subdue a fleeing felon 
who presents no threat of imminent death or serious physical injury to themselves or another 
person present.” Id. 
 81 See supra Figure 4. The nineteen jurisdictions are: Amsterdam, Bangkok, Brussels, Is-
tanbul, London, Moscow, Mumbai, Oslo, Paris, Riyadh, Rome, Seoul, Shanghai, Stockholm, 
Sydney, Tehran, Toronto, Vienna, and Warsaw. 
 82 CODE DE LA SECURITE INTERIEURE [CSI] [INTERNAL SECURITY CODE] art. L435-1 (V) 
(Fr.) [hereinafter FRENCH SECURITY CODE]. 
 83 Austl. Act, supra note 66; New South Wales Police Force Handbook 2015 (updated 
July 23, 2020) (Austl.) [hereinafter NSWPF Handbook]. 
 84 NSWPF Handbook, supra note 83. 
 85 Austl. Act, supra note 66, at § 230. 
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b. Particularized Threat 
 
 
Only nine jurisdictions met the particularized threat element of necessity,86 
meaning twenty-one jurisdictions—more than 70% of those studied—failed to 
meet this element.87 To satisfy the particularized threat element, law or policy 
must restrict police use of deadly force to situations involving a specific and 
heightened risk or threat to people, not property.88 In requiring the presence of a 
specific and particularized threat, as opposed to a more generalized risk of harm, 
this element of necessity reduces the amount of discretion police are granted to 
use lethal force, in close connection with the proportionality principle.89 For ex-
ample, the policy governing the Metropolitan Police in London identifies a 
heightened and specific risk by providing that police may consider using firearms 
“only where there is a serious risk to public or police safety.”90 By contrast, the 
law in Vienna authorizes police use of deadly force to arrest or prevent the escape 
 
 86 See supra Figure 5. The nine jurisdictions are: Buenos Aires, Istanbul, Jakarta, Lagos, 
London, Mexico City, New York, Seoul, and Toronto. 
 87 See supra Figure 5. The twenty-one jurisdictions are: Amsterdam, Bangkok, Berlin, 
Brussels, Madrid, Moscow, Mumbai, Oslo, Paris, Riyadh, Rome, São Paulo, Shanghai, Stock-
holm, Sydney, Tehran, Toronto, Tokyo, Vienna, Warsaw, and Zurich. 
 88 See Basic Principles supra note 33, at Special Provision 9. See also 2014 UNSR Report 
supra note 34, at ¶58. 
 89 See DEADLY DISCRETION, supra note 39, at 15. 
 90 CODE OF PRACTICE ON ARMED POLICING AND POLICE USE OF LESS LETHAL WEAPONS, 

























































































































Particularized Threat Required (10)
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of a subject “who is generally dangerous to the security of the state, person or 
property.”91 Directives that do not require a particularized threat grant the police 
excessive discretion to use lethal force in situations where the threat posed to the 
officer or others is not truly heightened or serious enough in a specific, rather 
than a generalized, way. 
 
 c. Last Resort  
 
 
Twenty jurisdictions—almost 70% of those studied—met the last resort ele-
ment of necessity,92 meaning nine jurisdictions failed to satisfy this element.93 
Requiring that lethal force only be used as a last resort is critical to protect the 
right to life. To meet the last resort element, the law or policy must only authorize 
police use of deadly force after non-lethal options have been tried unsuccessfully 
or will be otherwise ineffective to prevent death or serious bodily harm. For ex-
ample, police in Oslo may only use firearms “when absolutely necessary and 
where more lenient means have been tried in vain or will obviously not 
 
 91 GESAMTE RECHTSVORSCHRIFT FÜR WAFFENGEBRAUCHSGESETZ 1969 [WAFFENGEBR- 
AUCHSGESETZ 1969] [FEDERAL ACT ON THE USE OF WEAPONS BY ORGANS OF THE FEDERAL 
POLICE AND MUNICIPAL GUARDS] BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] No. 149/1969, as amended, 
art. 7(3) (Austria). 
 92 See supra Figure 6. The twenty jurisdictions are: Amsterdam, Bangkok, Berlin, Brus-
sels, Buenos Aires, Istanbul, Jakarta, Lagos, London, Madrid, Mexico City, New York, Oslo, 
Stockholm, Sydney, Tehran, Tokyo, Toronto, Vienna, and Warsaw. 
 93 See supra Figure 6. The nine jurisdictions are: Moscow, Mumbai, Paris, Riyadh, Rome, 



















































































































Last Resort Satisfied (10)
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succeed.”94 The policy also establishes a firearms procedure that requires police 
officers to announce they are acting as police, encourage the subject to comply 
with their orders, assess the dangers of using a weapon, clearly warn people in 
the area that a weapon will be used, and, if possible, fire a warning shot.95 The 
policy in New York City states that “[r]espect for human life requires that, in all 
cases, firearms be used as a last resort, and then only to protect life.”96 By con-
trast, in Paris, law and policy do not clearly restrict police use of deadly force 
only as a last resort. Instead, among other situations, police may use firearms 
“[w]hen, after two summonses made aloud, they cannot otherwise defend the 




Only seven jurisdictions (Buenos Aires, Jakarta, Lagos, Mexico City, New 
York City, Seoul and Toronto) satisfied the proportionality principle. This means 
that twenty-two jurisdictions—almost 80% of the those studied—allow police 
officers to use deadly force in situations that do not involve a proportionate threat 
 
 94 Våpeninstruks for Politiet [Police Weapons Instructions], Jan. 2, 2020, § 4-3 (Nor.) 
[hereinafter Nor. Police Instructions]. 
 95 Id. § 4-2. 
 96 NYC FORCE PATROL GUIDE, supra note 80 (emphasis my own). 
 97 FRENCH SECURITY CODE, supra note 82; see also Loi 2017-258 du 28 février 2017 re-
lative à la sécurité publique (1) [Law 2017-258 of February 28, 2017 on Public Security (1)], 
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to life or serious bodily injury to the officer or other people.98 Proportionality 
provides the proper balance for the protection of life: it allows the police to use 
lethal force to protect against threats to life, and prohibits them from using such 
force where life or serious bodily harm are not at stake. 
Jurisdictions that met the proportionality requirement provided clear rules re-
quiring police use of deadly force to be proportional to the threat posed by the 
subject—i.e., only in response to a threat to life or serious bodily injury. For 
example, the policy in Seoul restricts police use of “high risk physical force,” 
including firearms, to incidents in which a subject presents a risk of “imminent 
and serious harm to the life or body of a police officer or a third party.”99 In 
Toronto, the police “shall not draw a handgun, point a firearm at a person or 
discharge a firearm unless he or she believes, on reasonable grounds, that to do 
so is necessary to protect against loss of life or serious bodily harm.”100 Regula-
tions in Jakarta state that “[t]he use of firearms shall be allowed only if strictly 
necessary to preserve human life.”101 The regulations further establish that police 
officers may only use firearms “when facing extraordinary circumstances,” for 
self-defense or in defense of another against a threat of death or serious injury, 
or to prevent a crime or other actions that threaten the life of others “where more 
persuasive measures are inadequate.”102  
By contrast, jurisdictions that fail to meet the proportionality requirement do 
so for several reasons. Some policies do not describe the nature of the threat 
posed by a subject in sufficient detail, or the threat is not elevated or serious 
enough to present a risk of death or serious bodily harm. For example, in Bang-
kok, the police may use firearms, among other situations, “when the perpetrator 
or suspect uses weapons to hinder an arrest.”103 In Tehran, the police may use 
firearms to “defend themselves against one or more people who attack without 
weapons, but the situation is such that without the use of weapons personal 
 
 98 See supra Figure 7. The twenty-two jurisdictions are: Amsterdam, Bangkok, Berlin, 
Brussels, Istanbul, London, Madrid, Moscow, Mumbai, Oslo, Paris, Riyadh, Rome, São Paulo, 
Shanghai, Stockholm, Sydney, Tehran, Tokyo, Vienna, Warsaw, and Zurich. 
 99 Gyeongchal Mullilyeog Haengsaui Gijungwa Bangbeob-e Gwanhan Gyuchig [Rules 
on the Standards and Methods of Exercising Police Force] National Police Agency Regulation 
No. 550, Jul. 18, 2019, § 2.2.5 (S. Kor.) [hereinafter South Korean Rules on the Standards of 
Exercising Police Force]. 
 100 Police Services Act, Equipment and Use of Force, R.R.O., 1990-926, § 9 (Can.) [here-
inafter Canadian Police Services Act]. 
 101 Peraturan Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia Nomor 1 [Regulation of the Chief of 
the Indonesian National Police Number 1], The Use of Force in Police Action, art. 47 (2009) 
[hereinafter Indonesian Regulation]. 
 102 Id. art. 47(2). 
 103 K.Tr.Ẁā d̂wy pramwl criyṭhrrm læa crryā br rṇ k̄hxng t̊ārwc ph.Ṣ̄.2551 [Police Rules 
on the Code of Ethics and Code of Conduct (No.2), B.E. 2553], art. 18 (Thai.) [hereinafter 
Thai Rules]. 
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defense is not possible.”104 In Mumbai, the police may use a firearm to arrest 
someone when they “have reason to suppose that crimes of particular gravity 
have been committed[,]” noting that the police “are punishable if they fail to do 
so.”105 
Law and policy in other jurisdictions completely fail to describe the nature of 
the threat posed by a subject for which police may employ lethal force. For ex-
ample, in Tokyo, police regulations provide that 
[w]hen shooting a pistol at an opponent, it is sufficient for a police 
officer to believe that there is no other means, considering the 
necessity of using a pistol, the balance of legal benefits, the mode 
of counterattack, etc. You can shoot a pistol at your opponent 
only for good reason.106  
In Stockholm, the police may use firearms to arrest a person suspected of com-
mitting any crime included in a long list, such as arson or robbery, without ref-
erence to the whether the suspect poses a threat of any kind at the time of the 
arrest.107 
Other jurisdictions that fail the proportionality requirement authorize police 
use of deadly force to protect property or other non-human interests. For exam-
ple, in Brussels, the police may use firearms “when, in the event of absolute ne-
cessity, the police officers . . . cannot defend otherwise . . . posts, transport of 
dangerous goods or places entrusted to their protection.”108 In Moscow, the po-
lice may use firearms “to repel a group or armed attack on buildings, premises, 
structures and other objects of state and municipal bodies . . . .”109 The police in 
Tehran may use firearms to “protect classified places, especially vital and sensi-
tive places against . . . destruction, fire, [and] looting of documents and property 
. . . .”110 And in Oslo, the police are permitted to use firearms against “persons 
who . . . are considered particularly dangerous to . . . Norway’s independence” 
or who “seriously threaten fundamental national interests.”111 Policies that allow 
 
 104 Iran Weapons Law, supra note 66, art. 3. 
 105 Bombay Police Manual, Vol. III, §189 Use of Firearms in Making an Arrest, at 184 (8th 
ed. 1959). 
 106 Keishichō keisatsukan kenjū shiyō oyobi toriatsukai kitei [Metropolitan Police Depart-
ment Police Officer Handgun Usage and Handling Regulations], Law No. 13 of 2002, art. 10 
(Japan). 
 107 24 ch. 2 § KUNGÖRELSE OM POLISENS ANVÄNDNING AV SKJUTVAPEN (Svensk författ-
ningssamling [SFS] 1969:84) (Swed.) [hereinafter SWEDISH PROCLAMATION]. 
 108 Loi sur la fonction de police [Law on the police function], Aug. 5, 1992, Interieur Fonc-
tion Publique Justice, Dec. 12, 1992, 27124, art. 38 (Belg.). 
 109 Federal’nyy Zakon O Politsii [Federal Law on the Police], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. 
GAZ.] Jan. 28, 2011, art. 23(6) (Russ.). 
 110 Iran Weapons Law, supra note 66, art. 3(8). 
 111 Nor. Police Instructions, supra note 94, § 4-3(1)(b). 
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police to use lethal force to protect property or other non-human interests fail 
proportionality in failing to restrict the use of lethal force only to prevent death 
or serious bodily harm. 
 
iv. Accountability  
Figure 8: Accountability grades by city 
 
The principle of accountability requires an effective review process involving 
full reporting to or investigation by an independent external oversight body for 
all instances of lethal use of force.112 Effective accountability ensures that police 
officers are not above the law.113 The principle of accountability works with the 
principle of legality to give effect to the substantive requirements of necessity 
and proportionality.   
Only three jurisdictions (Amsterdam, Brussels, and Stockholm)—about 10% 
of those studied—satisfied the principle of accountability and received the full 
twenty-five points. Law governing local and federal police in Brussels, for 
 
 112 See 2014 UNSR Report, supra note 34, ¶ 100; Code of Conduct, supra note 32, art. 3, 
cmt. (c); Basic Principles, supra note 33, special provision 11(f) and reporting and review 
procedures 22. 
 113 See McCann v. United Kingdom, App No. 18984/91, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97, ¶ 161 
(1995) (holding that “a general legal prohibition of arbitrary killing by the agents of the State 
would be ineffective, in practice, if there existed no procedure for reviewing the lawfulness of 
the use of lethal force by State authorities”). 
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example, requires reporting to the General Inspectorate of Federal Police and the 
Local Police, an independent body, for every “shooting incident.”114 In the Neth-
erlands, according to the ‘Official instruction for the police, the Royal Nether-
lands Marechaussee and other investigating officers,’ use of force by police must 
be reported to the assistant public prosecutor.115   
The laws and policies applicable to twenty-one of the twenty-nine jurisdic-
tions—more than 70% of those studied—require internal reporting or an inves-
tigation for lethal use of force. Eight of those jurisdictions—Bangkok, Istanbul, 
Jakarta, Lagos, Madrid, Seoul, Sydney, and Tokyo—require internal reporting 
only with no external notification or reporting requirements.116 Internal investi-
gations alone are an inadequate response to uses of lethal force.117 While a rig-
orous internal review and reporting process is vital for effective oversight 
through the chain of command, there is also a clear conflict of interest that can 
lead to real and perceived failures to hold fellow officers accountable. Police 
Force Order 237 for officers in Nigeria, for example, requires each officer to 
“report any discharge of a weapon” within the department but does not require 
an unbiased, independent entity to evaluate the report.118 Without external over-
sight, police departments serve as the judge of their own compliance with the 
law. 
A smaller number of laws and policies require notifying an external body 
whenever death or serious injury results from the use of force. In Toronto, regu-
lations require a full internal investigation anytime a weapon is discharged, as 
well as external reporting and an independent investigation for any use of force 
that results in death or serious injury.119 In Tehran, executive regulations require 
 
 114 Omzendbrief GPI 62 betreffende de bewapening van de geïntegreerde politie, gestruc-
tureerd op twee niveaus [Circular GPI 62 Relating to the Arming of the Integrated Police, 
Structured at Two Levels] of Feb. 14, 2008, B.S., Feb. 29, 2008, 12615 (Belg.). 
 115 Besluit van 8 april 1994, Stb. 1994, art. 17.3 (Neth.). 
 116 See Nigeria Police Order, supra note 72; Indonesian Regulation, supra note 101, at art. 
49; South Korean Rules on the Standards of Exercising Police Force, supra note 99; Turkish 
Police Duty and Situation Law, supra note 22; Zhāohé sānshíqī nián guójiā gōng’ān wěiyuán 
huì guīzé dì qī hào, Keisatsukan-tō kenjū shiyō oyobi toriatsukai kihan [National Public Safety 
Commission, handgun usage and handling rules for police officers], Rule No. 7 of 1957, ch. 
2, art. 10 (Japan); Reglamento para el Cuerpo de Policía Municipal (B.O.C.M. 1995, 6) 
(Spain); Law Enforcement Conduct Commission Act 2016 (NSW) s 113 (Austl.); Thai Rules, 
supra note 103. 
 117 U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 60. 
 118 Nigeria Police Order, supra note 72. 
 119 Canadian Police Services Act, supra note 100; TORONTO POLICE SERV., CORPORATE 
RISK MANAGEMENT ANNUAL REPORT 2018 20 (2018), http://www.torontopolice.on.ca/publi-
cations/files/reports/crm2018annualreport.pdf (“The Ontario Special Investigations Unit 
(S.I.U.) is a civilian law enforcement agency, independent of the police, with a mandate to 
maintain confidence in Ontario’s police services by assuring the public that police actions 
resulting in serious injury, death, or allegations of sexual assault are subjected to rigorous, 
274 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 49:243 
the police to submit a full report to the “investigating judicial authority” when-
ever death or injury results from police use of force.120 New York law, however, 
only requires notifying the District Attorney’s Office “in all shooting cases” but 
does not require full reporting or an independent investigation.121 Russian federal 
law requires notifying the prosecutor when death or injury results, but not full 
reporting every time lethal force is used.122  
Five jurisdictions, Berlin, Rome, Mumbai, Paris, and Riyadh—about 17% of 
those studied—failed to meet any of the sub-elements of the accountability prin-
ciple and received zero points. Mumbai Police Manuals require officers to report 
use of force when dispersing a riot, but there is no broader reporting requirement 
for use of lethal force. Legislation is silent on accountability.123 In 2014, through 
the Maharashtra Police (Amendment and Continuance) Act, Maharashtra estab-
lished Police Complaint Authorities (PCAs), independent bodies required to in-
vestigate public complaints against police personnel.124 However, the law did not 
contain any mandatory reporting requirements for the police.  
 
independent investigations. Any incident which may reasonably fall within the mandate of the 
S.I.U. must be reported to the S.I.U. by the police service involved.”). 
 120 Executive Regulations of 30 April 2002 (Law on the Use of Weapons by Armed Forces 
Officers in Necessary Cases) n.5, art. 3 (Iran) (“In all cases when one or more armed officers, 
while carrying out their mission, shoot at an individual and result in his death or injury, 
whether the complaint is raised through the respective unit or by a private plaintiff, the relevant 
organization shall submit a comprehensive report on the action of the officer or officers and 
sent it to the investigating judicial authority, along with an expert opinion obtained from a 
panel consisting of representatives of the information security, the inspection, the legal office, 
and the respective armed unit. The expert panel should, with due diligence, give its opinion on 
whether the use of the weapon by the officer or officers complied with the relevant regulations 
or not.”). 
 121 CITY N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, PATROL GUIDE 221-04, § 25 “Force Investigation Division 
Supervisor” (Sept. 13, 2020), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_infor 
mation/public-pguide3.pdf [hereinafter NYC INVESTIGATION PATROL GUIDE]. 
 122 Federal’nyy zakon ot 3 iyulya 2016 g. N 226-FZ “O voyskakhnatsional’noy gvardii 
Rossiyskoy Federatsii” [Federal Law of July 3, 2016 N 226-FZ “On the Troops of the National 
Guard of the Russian Federation”] Chapter 3, Article 18.8 (“Each case of injury to a citizen or 
death of a citizen as a result of the use of physical force, special means, weapons, military and 
special equipment by a soldier (employee) of the National Guard troops as soon as possible, 
but no later than 24 hours, shall be notified to the prosecutor.”); Federal’nyi Zakon RF o fed-
eral’noy sluzhbe bezopasnosti [Federal Law of Russian on the Federal Security Service], 
Yevropeyskaya kimissiya za demokratiyu cherez parvo (Venetsianskaya komissiya) [Euro-
pean Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission)], 1995, No. 40-FZ, art. 
14.2 (“The prosecutor shall be notified of each case of injury to a citizen or the occurrence of 
his death as a result of the use of weapons, special means or physical force by military person-
nel of the federal security service as soon as possible, but no later than 24 hours.”). 
 123 See Maharashtra State Security Corporation Act, No. 6 of 2010 (India); Code of Crim-
inal Procedure, Act No. 2 of 1974, §46 (1973) (India); Bombay State Reserve Police Force 
Act, No. 38 of 1951, as amended 1959 (India). 
 124 Maharashtra Police (Amendment and Continuance) Act, No. 24 of 2014 (India). 
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For the law enforcement in Berlin, the General Security and Order Act, ASOG 
Bln, establishes general obligations for supervision by superiors and reporting 
but does not explicitly set out processes for external investigation of use of lethal 
force by police officers.125 Our analysis focused on use of force legislation and 
policies, not the broader legal and constitutional framework in which police op-
erate. German police can, for example, be prosecuted for violating the criminal 
law and using disproportionate force.126 However, the close cooperation between 
prosecutors and police raises serious concerns about the neutrality and independ-
ence of prosecutors for effective accountability, especially where police are not 
required to report every instance of use of lethal force to the prosecutor.127 The 
number of prosecutions and convictions of police officers for violations of law 
in Germany is significantly lower than the number of alleged cases of miscon-
duct.128 Where there is no explicit requirement in law and policy directing an 
officer to report each use of lethal force, followed by an independent investiga-
tion, accountability is incomplete. 
 
B. Failure to Safeguard Life: Common Shortcomings of Use of Lethal Force 
Directives 
 
As the analysis above indicates, there is a global failure to meet a basic stand-
ard of respect for and protection of human rights in law enforcement. The world’s 
most resourced countries have failed to put in place laws and policies that pro-
vide clear and tangible directives to law enforcement about when and whether 
 
 125 Allgemeines Sicherheits- und Ordnungsgesetz [ASOG Bln] [General Safety and Order 
Act], Oct. 11, 2006, GVBL (Ger.); see also Ausführungsvorschriften für Vollzugsdienstkräfte 
der Polizeibehörde zum UZwG Bln [AV Pol UzwG Bln] [Implementing Regulations for En-
forcement Officers of the Police Authority to the UzwG Bln], June 20, 2016, GVBL (Ger.); 
Gesetz über den unmittelbarn Zwang bei Ausübung öffentlicher Gewalt durch Vollzugs-
beamte des Bundes [UZwG] [Law on Immediate Coercion in the Exercise of Official Author-
ity by Federal Law Enforcement Officers], Mar. 10, 1961, BGBLI at 1328 (Ger.), 
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/uzwg/BJNR001650961.html. Germany has federal police 
and state police (landespolizei) that operate in each of its sixteen federal states (länder). Each 
länder has its own state law governing the landespolizei’s use of firearms that generally mir-
rors the federal law on police use of lethal force, the “Law on direct coercion in the exercise 
of official authority by federal law enforcement officers” (UZwG). In Berlin, which is both a 
city and a länder, the Berlin police force is governed by state laws and ordinances, in addition 
to the national UZwG law. 
 126 Hartmut Aden, Germany, in THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT IN POLICE GOVERNANCE: 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM ASIA AND EUROPE 121 (Mario Aguja & Hans Born eds., 2017). 
 127 Kate Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1447 (2016). 
 128 See id.; see also Unknown Assailant: Insufficient Investigation into Alleged Ill-Treat-
ment by Police in Germany, AMNESTY INT’L (July 2010), https://www.amnesty.org/download/ 
Documents/36000/eur230022010en.pdf. 
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they may use lethal force against the people they serve. This reality, coupled with 
global reports of abuses by law enforcement, is cause for concern. Moreover, the 
analysis reveals some trends and common themes that shed light on the state of 
modern policing and its failure to adequately safeguard human life. It also pro-
vides some direction for future reform.   
 
i. Outdated and Anachronistic Laws and Policies  
 
A significant number of police departments around the world are governed by 
outdated and anachronistic laws and policies developed decades ago. Unsurpris-
ingly, these outdated directives are out of touch with today’s human rights stand-
ards and established best practices. In fact, the laws and policies governing police 
use of deadly force in almost 20% of the jurisdictions in this study are anti-
quated—Lagos, Mumbai, Rome, Stockholm and Tokyo. The age of these laws 
and policies may reflect weak political will to regulate police use of deadly force, 
and they contain problematic and anachronistic content that fails to meet the pro-
portionality and necessity principles. 
In Mumbai, for example, the law and policy regulating police use of deadly 
force was promulgated in 1951 and 1959.129 Mumbai’s overall grade of five re-
flects these antiquated legal and policy rules.130 The Bombay Police Manual 
(named after the previous name of the city) uses vague language, grants broad 
discretion for the use of firearms,131 and refers to old technologies.132 In doing 
so, the Manual fails to meet the proportionality and necessity principles.   
In Nigeria, the Police Act of 1943 is a colonial law that has not been updated 
in more than seventy-five years.133 Despite a newly proposed law and a recent 
order on police use of deadly force,134 the legislative basis for the police force is 
 
 129 Bombay State Reserve Police Force Act, supra note 123; Bombay Police Manual, Vols. 
I, II, III (8th ed. 1959). 
 130 See figure 9 on page 293 for an overview of Mumbai’s grade for each principle. 
 131 Volume III of the Bombay Police Manual appears to promote police use of firearms 
during an arrest. The Manual provides that the police “cannot desist upon a mere show of 
resistance, they are bound to redouble their efforts, even at the risk of their lives, if opposed; 
and the law protects them from any consequences which the resistance entails.” Bombay Po-
lice Manual, Vol. III, supra note 105, § 189. 
 132 Volume III of the Bombay Police Manual grants police the authority to use firearms to 
disperse an unlawful assembly, providing that “[f]iring even by .410 muskets has to be . . . a 
last resort while dealing with crowds or mobs. Whenever firing becomes unavoidable to dis-
perse unruly mobs; it could be ensured that the aim is kept low and directed against the most 
threatening part of the crowd.” Id. § 60(2). 
 133 Police Act (1943) Cap. (19) (Nigeria) [hereinafter Nigeria Police Act]. 
 134 Police Act (2020) Cap. (P19), (Repeal & Enact) Bill, 2020 (S.B.181); Nigeria Police 
Order, supra note 72. 
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a colonial vestige, and is a reminder that the National Assembly of Nigeria has 
not yet modernized. Notably, Nigeria’s high overall grade of sixty-five reflects 
the quality of the recent police order, not the content of the Act.135 Among other 
things, the Act does not appear to explicitly permit the police to use lethal force136 
and uses antiquated gender roles, establishing that a “woman police officer shall 
not be called upon to drill under arms or to take part in any baton or riot exer-
cise.”137 
In Japan, the national law governing the police was enacted in 1948 and the 
national rule on the use of firearms by the police was promulgated in 1957.138 
Like the Indian and Nigerian laws and policies, the Japanese law and regulation 
are outdated, referring only to “pistols” and “handguns,”139 using vague lan-
guage, and granting broad discretion to the police to use firearms. The law, for 
example, permits the police to use deadly force “for suppression of resistance to 
the execution of his or her official duty . . . within the limits judged reasonably 
necessary in the situation.”140   
In Sweden, the national law governing the police was enacted in 1984 and the 
rule regulating police use of firearms was adopted in 1969.141 The law and regu-
lation embody an antiquated approach to authorizing deadly force, based on the 
nature of the suspected crime involved in a particular incident, rather than the 
threat posed by the subject. These directives fail to satisfy both the proportional-
ity principle and the three elements of necessity. The law allows the police to use 
force and firearms to prevent a “punishable act,” without reference to the nature 
of the threat actually posed by the subject at the time of incident.142 The law 
further authorizes the use of lethal force in response to threats to “valuable prop-
erty or to extensive damage to the environment.”143  
These decades old laws and policies authorizing police use of lethal force, 
including one pre-independence, colonial law, provide an inadequate framework 
for modern law enforcement in these jurisdictions. As the examples above 
demonstrate, the failure to modernize these directives contributes to their inabil-
ity to meet international human rights standards.   
 
 
 135 See figure 9 on page 293 for an overview of Nigeria’s grade for each principle. 
 136 Nigeria Police Act, supra note 133, § 414. 
 137 Nigeria Police Act, supra note 133, § 123. 
 138 Keisatsukan gimu shikkō-hō [The Police Duties Execution Act], Law No. 136 of 1948 
(Japan); National Public Safety Commission, Handgun Usage and Handling Rules for Police 
Officers, supra note 116. 
 139 Metropolitan Police Department Police Officer Handgun Usage and Handling Regula-
tions, supra note 106, arts. 6–9. 
 140 Id. art. 7. 
 141 SWEDISH POLICE ACT, supra note 66; SWEDISH PROCLAMATION, supra note 107. 
 142 SWEDISH POLICE ACT, supra note 66, § 10(3). 
 143 Id. 
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ii. Overly Broad Discretion 
 
The use of lethal force directives in the majority of jurisdictions reviewed by 
this study provide broad discretion to police officers through vague, imprecise, 
and arbitrary, substantive standards. Human rights law dictates that lethal force 
only be authorized when police confront an imminent threat of death or serious 
injury. Where the standard is broader, the law fails to meet the necessity and 
proportionality principles. Our analysis of policies and laws revealed three dis-
tinct ways in which these directives grant broad discretion to police to use lethal 
force causing them to fail to comply with the human rights standard.  
First, a number of States authorize the use of lethal force on the suspicion of 
a crime having been committed instead of limiting the use of lethal force to cir-
cumstances when there is an imminent threat of death or serious injury. When 
police officers are authorized to use suspicion of past criminal behavior as the 
standard for when they may use lethal force, it makes every law enforcement 
officer the judge, jury, and executioner. In some circumstances, there may be an 
overlap between a crime being committed and a threat of death or serious injury. 
If an individual is caught during or immediately after they committed a murder 
and then threatens the officer(s) or another person with imminent violence, the 
use of lethal force may be justified. However, when the legal framework author-
izes the use of lethal force with no requirement that there be a current or immi-
nent threat of death or serious injury, the police are given overly broad discretion 
to equate suspected past behavior, however distant in time or uncorroborated, 
with current dangerousness. Such authority violates the principles of necessity 
and proportionality.144 
For example, for Mumbai Police in India, the use of deadly force is tied to the 
nature of the crime for which a subject is “accused,” not the nature of the threat 
the subject poses at the time lethal force is used.145 Similarly, in Stockholm, Swe-
den, the focus for when deadly force may be used is on the particular kind of 
offense the subject is suspected of, rather than the threat the subject poses.146 
Similar standards appear in legislation and policy governing police forces in 
 
 144 2014 UNSR Report, supra note 34. 
 145 Code of Criminal Procedure, supra note 123; Bombay Police Manual, Vol. III, supra 
note 105, at 183. 
 146 SWEDISH PROCLAMATION, supra note 107. 
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Vienna,147 Berlin,148 Tokyo, 149 Oslo,150  Warsaw,151 Seoul,152 Zurich,153 and Am-
sterdam.154  
Second, some laws and policies expand police discretion by providing a list 
of instances where lethal force is authorized that include threats to places or to 
imprecise and vague interests like public order or national security.155 For exam-
ple, Austrian law permits the use of a firearm “to suppress a rebellion or riot.”156 
The Netherlands similarly authorizes the use of firearms to “curb riots or other 
 
 147 See Austria Weapons Use Act, supra note 66 (“3. [T]o enforce the arrest or prevention 
of the escape of a person who is referred to a judicially criminal act, which can only be com-
mitted intentionally and is threatened with a prison sentence of more than one year, or who is 
urgently suspected, alone or in connection with their behavior in the event of arrest or escape, 
identifies them as someone who is generally dangerous to the security of the state, person or 
property”). 
 148 Gesetz über die Anwendung unmittelbaren Zwanges bei der Ausübung öffentlicher 
Gewalt durch Vollzugsbeamte des Landes Berlin [UZwG Bln] [Law on the Application of 
Immediate Coercion in the Exercise of Official Authority by Law Enforcement Officers of the 
State of Berlin], June 22, 1970, BERLIN GESETZ- UND VERORDNUNGSBLATT [BER GVBL] §11 
(Ger.). (“Use of firearms to prevent illegal acts: A law enforcement officer may shoot at indi-
viduals in order to prevent them from the imminent execution or continuation of an illegal act 
which, under the circumstances, turns out to be a) a crime or b) an offense involving the use 
or carrying of firearms or explosives represents.”). 
 149 The Police Duties Execution Act, supra note 138. 
 150 Nor. Police Instructions, supra note 94, § 4-3 (“§ 4-3. Terms of use of firearms (1) 
Firearms may be used only when absolutely necessary and where more lenient means have 
been tried in vain or will obviously not succeed, in situations where a) the officer himself or 
others are threatened or subjected to a serious act of violence or other gross violation of integ-
rity, and the use of weapons appears necessary to prevent loss of life or serious injury, or b) it 
is considered necessary to arrest or stop a person who is convicted or with a high degree of 
security suspected of murder, other serious acts of violence or attempted crimes of violence, 
or of persons who for other reasons are considered particularly dangerous to human life or 
health, Norway’s independence, or that’s seriously threatens fundamental national interests.”). 
 151 USTAWA O ŚRODKACH PRZYMUSU BEZPOŚREDNIEGO I BRONI PALNEJ [LAW ON MEASURES 
OF DIRECT COERCION AND FIREARMS], art. 45(3)(b) (Pol.). 
 152 Gyeongchalgwan jigmujibhaengbeob [Act on the Performance of Duties by Police Of-
ficers], Act No. 14839, Jul. 26, 2017, art. 10-4(1)(2)(a) (S. Kor.). 
 153 POLIZEIGESETZ [POLG] [POLICE ACT] Apr. 23, 2007, LS 550.1, § 17(b) (Switz.) (“The 
use of a firearm may be justified in particular . . . if a person has committed a serious crime or 
a serious offence or is strongly suspected of such a crime or offence and wants to flee”). 
 154 Besluit van 8 april 1994, art. 7(b) (Neth.). 
 155 See, e.g., SWEDISH PROCLAMATION, supra note 107; Nor. Police Instructions, supra note 
94, § 4-3. 
 156 See Austria Weapons Use Act, supra note 66 (“Article 7: The use of a weapon against 
people with a risk to life is only permitted: 1. in the case of just self-defense in defense of a 
person; 2. to suppress a rebellion or riot; 3. to enforce the arrest or prevention of the escape of 
a person who is referred to a judicially criminal act, which can only be committed intentionally 
and is threatened with a prison sentence of more than one year, or who is urgently suspected, 
alone or in connection with their behavior in the event of arrest or escape, identifies them as 
someone who is generally dangerous to the security of the state, person or property.”). 
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serious disorder” without requiring that there be a threat of imminent violence 
that may result in death or serious injury.157 One Chinese regulation authorizes 
the use of force and crowd control weapons if a group is “ganging together in 
affrays, beating other persons, creating disturbances, insulting women or con-
ducting other indecent activities” or “illegally holding an assembly.”158  
Authorizing lethal force to safeguard property or an imprecise interest like 
national security, violates the principles of necessity and proportionality. An-
other regulation in China authorizes use of lethal force to “prevent and stop seri-
ous violent crimes, avoid casualties, and property losses.”159 French law author-
izes the use of firearms by police to defend places, without further explanation 
of the kind of threat they must be defending from and whether threats to property 
alone can justify defense through lethal means.160 Russian legislation contains 
similar language authorizing the use of firearms to “repel a group or armed attack 
on objects . . . buildings . . . [or] structures.”161 While an attack or a threat against 
a place or structure could involve a threat to life, the language in these laws and 
policies fail to make that clear, thereby granting excessive discretion to law en-
forcement.   
Finally, many States adopt legislation or policy on the use of firearms specif-
ically instead of regulating use of lethal force more broadly. While we did not 
 
 157 Besluit van 8 april 1994, art. 7(c) (Neth.). 
 158 Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó rénmín jǐngchá shǐyòng jǐng xiè hé wǔqì tiáolì (中华人
民共和国人民警察使用警械和武器条例) [Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on 
Use of Police Implements and Arms by the People’s Police] (promulgated by Order No. 191 
of the State Council, Jan. 16, 1996), 1 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan Gongbao 
[PRC State Council Gazette], art. 7 (China). 
 159 Gōng’ān jīguān rénmín jǐngchá pèidài shǐyòng qiāngzhī guīfàn de tōngzhī (公安机关
人民警察佩带使用枪支 规范》的通知) [Regulations on the Carry and Use of Guns by the 
People’s Police of Public Security Organs] (promulgated by the Ministry of Public Security, 
Jan. 16, 2015, effective May 1, 2015), ST. COUNCIL GAZ., art. 5 (China). The People’s Police-
men of the People’s Republic of China, the police force in China, consists of the Public Secu-
rity Police, the State Security Police, the Prison Police, and the Judicial Police. The principal 
police and security authority for China is the Public Security Police, which is a centralized 
police system that operates under the Ministry of Public Security. The Public Security Police’s 
use of force activities are mainly governed by administrative regulations. 
 160 FRENCH SECURITY CODE, supra note 82 (“In the performance of their duties and wearing 
their uniform or external insignia and apparent from their quality, the agents of the national 
police and the soldiers of the national gendarmerie can, in addition to the cases mentioned in 
article L. 211-9, use their weapons in the event of absolute necessity and in a strictly propor-
tionate manner: 1. When attacks on life or physical integrity are brought against them or 
against others or when armed persons threaten their life or their physical well-being or those 
of others; 2. When, after two summons made aloud, they cannot otherwise defend the places 
they occupy or the persons entrusted to them.”). 
 161 Federal’nyi Zakon RF o federal’noy sluzhbe bezopasnosti [Federal Law of Russian on 
the Federal Security Service], Yevropeyskaya kimissiya za demokratiyu cherez parvo (Venet-
sianskaya komissiya) [European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commis-
sion)], 1995, No. 40-FZ, art. 143(f). 
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penalize laws and use of force policies for focusing on firearms, the practice is 
problematic because it results in lack of regulation of other law enforcement tac-
tics that can also be lethal.162 For instance, the tragic killing of George Floyd in 
the United States and the murder of Cédric Chouviat in France demonstrate the 
lethality of neck restraints.163 Numerous crowd control and other “less” lethal 
weapons—including kinetic impact projectiles, chemical irritants, and disorien-
tation devices—have proved deadly as well.164 By limiting regulations to fire-
arms, States fail to regulate other equipment or methods that should be deployed 
with great care and only in circumstances when the officer is confronting a threat 
of death or grave injury.  
For example, legislation governing police in Sweden provides instruction on 
when force is authorized and, through a separate law, specifies when a firearm 
may be used. By having two instruments setting out different directives, the legal 
framework in Sweden fails to clarify when force may be considered lethal with-
out the use of a firearm and what standard should apply in those circumstances.165 
The Netherlands similarly limits its instructions on lethal use of force to different 
kinds of firearms and selected crowd control equipment.166 Regulating firearms 








 162 See Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 36 (2018) on Article 6 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 30, 2018); see also U.N. HUM. RTS.: OFF. HIGH COMM’R, GUIDANCE ON 
LESS LETHAL WEAPONS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT, U.N. Sales No. E.20.XIV.2 (2020), 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CCPR/LLW_Guidance.pdf. 
 163 See French Police Officers Charged Over Death of Man Put in Chokehold, GUARDIAN 
(July 16, 2020, 9:14 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/16/french-police-offi 
cers-charged-with-manslaughter-over-mans-death-cedric-chouviat; see also Harmeet Kaur & 
Janine Mack, The Cities, States and Countries Finally Putting an End to Police Neck Re-
straints, CNN (June 16, 2020 6:24 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/10/world/police-polic 
ies-neck-restraints-trnd/index.html. 
 164 See ROHINI J. HAAR & VINCENT IACOPINO, INT’L NETWORK CIV. LIBERTIES ORGS. & 
PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS., LETHAL IN DISGUISE: THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF CROWD-
CONTROL WEAPONS (2015), https://www.inclo.net/issues/lethal-in-disguise/. 
 165 See generally SWEDISH POLICE ACT, supra note 66; see also SWEDISH PROCLAMATION, 
supra note 107, § 2. The Swedish Police Authority is the main law enforcement body in Swe-
den. While there are ninety-five local police districts among the seven police regions, all are 
policed by highly centralized Swedish Police Authority which is subject to the National Police 
Commissioner. 
 166 Besluit van 8 april 1994, arts. 7(c), 8, 9, 11 (Neth.). 
 167 See Basic Principles, supra note 33. 
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iii. Limits of External Accountability and Lack of Transparency  
 
Another common feature in the laws and policies studied is the absence of 
meaningful accountability mechanisms, a failure which seriously undermines 
any effort to cabin police discretion. As explained above, only three jurisdictions, 
Amsterdam, Brussels, and Stockholm, require full reporting to or an investiga-
tion by an external oversight body for every use of lethal force. For all other 
jurisdictions reviewed, accountability mechanisms varied significantly in key 
factors that impact efficacy, including: independence, powers of oversight, and 
ability to impose civil and criminal sanctions for abuses of discretion.  
Where jurisdictions have external accountability mechanisms, they tend to 
rely on two different forms: (1) an ombudsman or a civilian oversight body,168 
or (2) a public prosecutor.169 These mechanisms function differently and thus 
provide varying levels of accountability. An independent civilian body or an om-
budsman is specifically charged with oversight of public officials to ensure their 
compliance with legal requirements and protection of human rights. Depending 
on the structure, these bodies can investigate and issue recommendations or pub-
lic reports, but they do not typically prosecute or punish, which limits their im-
pact.170 Prosecutors, on the other hand, can prosecute and punish. However, their 
mandate is broad—the enforcement of laws—and they regularly collaborate with 
police departments, which may or may not influence their propensity to investi-
gate police action.171 Thus, each of these mechanisms raises distinct possibilities 
for effective oversight as well as distinct concerns and shortcomings.  
 
 168 See e.g., Organic Act on Ombudsman, B.E. 2552 (2009) Sec.13 (Thai.); Defender of 
Rights, INDEP. POLICE COMPLAINTS AUTHORITIES’ NETWORK, https://ipcan.org/members/defen 
sor-of-rights (last visited Mar. 20, 2021); NYC INVESTIGATION PATROL GUIDE, supra note 121 
(requiring a notification to the district attorney, but no reporting to the Civilian Complaint 
Review Board). 
 169 See, e.g., Ambtsinstructie voor de politie, de Koninklijke marechaussee enandere op-
sporingsambt [Official instruction for the police, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, and 
other investigating officers] (2020) art. 17(1); Polisens användning av tjänstevapen, 
ÅKLAGARMYNDIGHETEN (Swed.), https://www.aklagare.se/om-oss/organisation/sarskilda-akl 
agarkammaren/polisens-anvandning-av-tjanstevapen/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2021); NYC 
INVESTIGATION PATROL GUIDE, supra note 121. 
 170 As the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights noted while examining civilian boards in the 
United States, “[t]he concern . . . is that depending on which model (i.e., investigative, review, 
or audit) the level of oversight and authority may be extremely limited.” U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. 
RTS., POLICE USE OF FORCE: AN EXAMINATION OF MODERN POLICING PRACTICES 76 (2018) 
https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2018/11-15-Police-Force.pdf. 
 171 See Zusha Elinson, More Police Go to Trial in Killings, But Convictions Remain Rare, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/more-police-go-to-trial-in-killings 
-but-convictions-remain-rare-1443044871. 
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Where an independent civilian or executive body serves as the external ac-
countability mechanism, the body is often specifically charged with receiving 
and reviewing complaints from the public or opening an inquiry when the public 
interest demands it. In those cases, our grading system awarded full points for 
accountability only if the police department required officers to send a full report 
to such a body after each instance of use of lethal force. However, Belgian laws 
and policies were the only ones that required such a report.172 Often police do 
not have an obligation on their own initiative to report every use of lethal force 
to these independent mechanisms. Other jurisdictions allow for discretion as to 
whether instances of use of lethal force should be investigated. Thailand, for ex-
ample, empowers the Ombudsman to investigate whenever a complaint from the 
public alleges injuries to the public or the public interest and authorizes the office 
to initiate an investigation when it finds it to be in the public interest.173 However, 
the Ombudsman is not required to investigate each use of lethal force, nor are 
police officers required to report use of lethal force to the Ombudsman. Simi-
larly, the Defender of Rights in France has the authority to review complaints 
from the public for violation of rights, which the body then evaluates for merit, 
but no publicly available policy requires the police to report the use of lethal 
force to this or any other independent oversight body.174  
Other jurisdictions rely on public prosecutors for external accountability and 
face a different set of challenges, such as the designation of the appropriate pros-
ecutor’s office. According to the Chief Administrative Judge of New York State 
Courts, the Honorable Judge Lawrence Marks, “there is a perceived conflict of 
interest when prosecutors are expected to both zealously investigate and prose-
cute police officers, while maintaining a good and symbiotic relationship with 
them to fulfill their professional duties.”175 In Sweden, the use of a weapon 
against a citizen requires an investigation led by the “Special Prosecutor’s Of-
fice,” whose chamber is  “separate from other prosecutorial activities.”176 The 
 
 172 GENERAL POLICE INSPECTORATE, https://www.aigpol.be/nl/over-ons (last visited Mar. 
19, 2021); Omzendbrief GPI 62 betreffende de bewapening van de geïntegreerde politie, ge-
structureerd op twee niveaus [Circular GPI 62 Relating to the Arming of the Integrated Police, 
Structured at Two Levels] of Feb. 14, 2008, BELGISCH STAATSBLAD [B.S.] [Official Gazette 
of Belgium], Feb 29, 2008, 12615 (Belg.). 
 173 Organic Act on Ombudsman, supra note 168 (“In exercising of powers and duties under 
(1) (a), (b) and (c), the Ombudsmen shall proceed where there is a complaint thereon, provided 
that the Ombudsmen is of opinion that such act causes injuries to the public or it is necessary 
to protect public interests and, in such case, the Ombudsmen may consider and conduct inves-
tigation irrespective of a complaint.”). 
 174 DEFENDER OF RIGHTS, REPUBLIC OF FRANCE, https://www.defenseurdesdroits.fr/ (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2021). 
 175 U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., supra note 170, at 80. 
 176 Polisens användning av tjänstevapen, ÅKLAGARMYNDIGHETEN, https://www.aklagare.s 
e/om-oss/organisation/sarskilda-aklagarkammaren/polisens-anvandning-av-tjanstevapen/ 
(“When a police officer in the service uses his service weapon against a person, a preliminary 
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requirement for police to report every use of lethal force, together with the sep-
aration of the Special Prosecutor’s office from the office charged with regular 
prosecutorial duties, is one of the strongest examples of external oversight.  
Finally, the process of researching use of lethal force directives revealed an-
other barrier to accountability—the absence of comprehensive data collection 
and transparency on use of lethal force. Transparency is necessary to allow the 
public to evaluate how well existing policies and systems are working. Data and 
information provided by governments on law enforcement use of force is ex-
tremely scarce in most, if not all, jurisdictions.177 Few police departments are 
required to publish data on the use of force,178 and many do not even publish the 
policies that guide their officers’ operational decisions in this regard.179 The 
United States, for example, did not have a national database on police use of 
force until 2019, and the current database is based on voluntary reporting by po-
lice departments. As a result, the database remains woefully incomplete, contain-
ing data from fewer than half of the approximately 18,000 police departments in 
 
investigation (criminal investigation) is usually initiated. Such investigations are always led 
by prosecutors at the Special Prosecutor’s Office. This chamber is separate from other prose-
cutorial activities.”). 
 177 As Amnesty International explains, “It’s hard to get reliable figures on killings by police 
because many governments do not collect or publish this data . . . . Most of the available data 
refers to specific countries or time periods, and are often estimates by NGOs or human rights 
groups.” See Police Violence, AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/polic 
e-brutality/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2021). This problem occurs both because of a lack of data 
collection at the national level by governments (see, e.g., Wesley Skogan, Use of Force and 
Police Reform in Brazil: A National Survey of Police Officers, 14 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 319, 
322 (2013)) and at the institutional level by police departments (see, e.g., Eddie Bruce-Jones, 
German Policing at the Intersection: Race, Gender, Migrant Status and Mental Health, 56 
RACE & CLASS 36, 40 (2015)) and because of a failure to publish data (see, e.g., Mexico: 
Overhaul Police Forces, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 24, 2020, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/24/mexico-overhaul-police-forces). Unfortunately, the 
data that is published by the government is not always reliable. See Ignacio Cano, Racial Bias 
in Police Use of Lethal Force in Brazil, 11 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 31 (2010). In some countries, 
the lack of data on police killings provided by government has compelled civil society to de-
velop its own accounting mechanism. See, e.g., Violencia Policial, CELS, https://violenciapoli 
cial.org.ar (last visited Mar. 30, 2021). 
 178 See generally Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing?, 96 MARQ. 
L. REV. 1119 (2013); Peter Kim, 17 Years of Police Violence in Canada, PIVOT (Mar. 28, 
2019), https://www.pivotlegal.org/17_years_of_police_violence_in_canada (discussing lack 
of centralized comprehensive statistics on use of force in Canada). 
 179 While some governments have instituted “transparency portals” through which such 
information may be requested, poor data quality and lengthy delay frustrate accessibility. For 
example, one Australian study found that the “inflexible, antiquated and under-resourced” data 
collection system led to underreporting and inaccurate information. OFF. POLICE INTEGRITY, 
REVIEW OF THE USE OF FORCE BY AND AGAINST VICTORIAN POLICE 12 (2009), 
https://www.ibac.vic.gov.au/docs/default-source/reviews/opi/review-of-the-use-of-force-by-
and-against-victorian-police---july-2009.pdf?sfvrsn=c4586175_8. 
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the country.180 Buenos Aires requires statistics on the number of cases of death 
or bodily injury, including demographic data about victims, to be published quar-
terly in the Federal Gazette,181 but reports by civil society have highlighted con-
cerns about its lack of comprehensiveness.182  
On the other hand, some States do engage in public reporting. Mexico’s 2019 
National Law on Use of Force requires annual public reports on use of force, 
including the number of people killed by police use of force.183 The United King-
dom releases police use of force statistics on a public website. The data covers 
the whole of England and Wales and includes all uses of force broken down by 
tactics, outcomes, and demographics.184   
The Handbook of the UN Office of Drugs and Crimes requires transparency 
through reporting key data and outcomes of independent investigations for ef-
fective oversight.185 Making laws and policies on use of force and accountability 
mechanisms, especially outcomes of misconduct investigations, accessible to the 
public promotes transparency, as does providing data on how police use force. 
Without knowing what the standards are and being able to measure existing prac-
tice against those standards, the public cannot adequately assess whether govern-
ment is protecting their rights and advocate for needed reforms. Lack of data on 
lethal use of force, as well as police and civilian interactions more broadly, makes 
it nearly impossible to evaluate the breadth and depth of the problem.186  
 
V. GLOBAL REFORM: THE IMPORTANCE OF PAPER AS A PATH TO 
PRACTICE 
 
Our study demonstrates that even in the world’s most well-resourced coun-
tries, use of lethal force directives fail to restrict law enforcement’s use of state-
sanctioned violence in accordance with human rights. The failure of States to 
 
 180 National Use-of-Force Data Collection, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, 
https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr/use-of-force (last visited Mar. 30, 2021). 
 181 Resolution No. 8 of the Council for Defense of Rights of Human Person, Art. 2 (Buenos 
Aires). 
 182 See Violencia Policial, CELS, https://violenciapolicial.org.ar/ (last visited Mar. 30, 
2021) (noting the lack of complete and accessible official data on police use of force). 
 183 Ley Nacional Sobre el Uso de la Fuerza Art. 35, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 
27-05-2019 (Mex.). 
 184 Police Use of Force Statistics, GOV.UK: HOME OFF., https://www.gov.uk/government/c 
ollections/police-use-of-force-statistics (last visited Mar. 30, 2021). 
 185 U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 60, at iv-v. 
 186 See, e.g., Lynne Peeples, What the Data Say About Police Brutality and Racial Bias—
and Which Reforms Might Work, NATURE (June 19, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d4 
1586-020-01846-z; see also Dean Knox, Will Lowe & Jonathan Mummolo, Administrative 
Records Mask Racially Biased Policing, 114 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 619 (2020). 
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make this most basic commitment to use lethal force against their own population 
only where necessary, proportional, accountable, and legal can and has had dire 
consequences around the world. Globally, reports abound of law enforcement 
bodies abusing and misusing the awesome power they have been granted.187 
States that take the human rights of their own populations seriously must, at min-
imum, put in place a legal and policy framework that codifies this commitment. 
As States have an affirmative obligation to protect human rights, failure to put 
such directives in place indicates institutional acquiescence or, even worse, an 
intention to maintain law enforcement systems that allow for abuses of power.   
 
 187 Breiller Pires, Entre a vida e a morte sob tortura, violência policial se estende por todo 
o Brasil, blindada pela impunidade [Between Life and Death Under Torture, Police Violence 
Extends Throughout Brazil, Shielded by Impunity], EL PAÍS  (June 30, 2020, 8:51 
AM), https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2020-06-30/entre-a-vida-e-a-morte-sob-tortura-violenci 
a-policial-se-estende-por-todo-o-brasil-blindada-pela-impunidade.html (discussing that po-
lice lethality, victims of which are mostly black, increased drastically in Brazil this year); Ál-
varo Cordero, Qué hay detrás de las protestas contra la brutalidad policial en Colom-
bia [What’s Behind the Protests Against Police Brutality in Colombia], EL ORDEN 
MUNDIAL (Sept. 17, 2020), https://elordenmundial.com/protestas-brutalidad-policia-colombia 
-violencia-america-latina/ (describing the “crisis of violence” that Colombia faces where the 
militarized National Police Force excessively kills in Bogota and various independently armed 
groups commit massacres throughout the country); violencia policial en todo el país: es ur-
gente reformar las fuerzas de seguridad [Police Violence Across the Country: It is Urgent to 
Reform the Security Forces], CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS LEGALES Y SOCIALES (June 25, 
2020), https://www.cels.org.ar/web/2020/06/https-www-youtube-com-watchvjfmvu-aurmo/ 
(detailing the many cases of police violence in 2020 and calling upon the government to enact 
major reforms in Argentina); Daniel Geradtz, Polizeigewalt in Deutschland: Deutlich mehr 
Fälle als vermutet - vor allem bei Demos [Police Violence in Germany: Significantly More 
Cases than Expected—Especially During Demonstrations], MERKUR (Sept. 21, 2020, 5:13 
PM), https://www.merkur.de/politik/polizeigewalt-in-deutschland-deutlich-mehr-faelle-als-v 
ermutet-vor-allem-bei-demos-zr-13015647.html (explaining the results of a study in Germany 
on the number of cases of police violence and the high number of unreported cases); Nigeria 
Police Brutality Inquiry Hears Graphic Testimony, BBC (Oct. 27, 
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54706977 (covering the Nigerian inquiry into 
police brutality that resulted from public protests against the police); Protests Follow Yet An-
other Custodial Death in Egypt, PEOPLES DISPATCH (Sept. 9, 2020), https://peoplesdispatch.or 
g/2020/09/09/protests-follow-yet-another-custodial-death-in-egypt/ (describing protests fol-
lowing another death of a man in police custody, something that occurs frequently in Egypt 
and is the cause for international criticism); Turkey: Police, Watchmen Involved in Torture, 
Ill-Treatment, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 29, 2020, 12:00 
AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/29/turkey-police-watchmen-involved-torture-ill-tr 
eatment# (describing the worrying pattern of police violence in Turkey through recent cases); 
Krista Stelkia, Police Brutality in Canada: A Symptom of Structural Racism and Colonial Vi-
olence, YELLOWHEAD INST. (July 15, 2020), https://yellowheadinstitute.org/2020/07/15/police 
-brutality-in-canada-a-symptom-of-structural-racism-and-colonial-violence/; see also Ley-
land Cecco, Canada Urged to Open Its Eyes to Systemic Racism in Wake of Police Violence, 
GUARDIAN (June 14, 2020, 12:47 
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/14/canada-systemic-racism-history (dis-
cussing the link between police brutality and structural racism in Canada). 
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Moreover, decades of research have shed light on the arbitrary, and too often 
discriminatory, factors that influence law enforcement officers’ decisions to em-
ploy force while on duty. These findings further highlight the critical need for 
States to implement clear directives to restrict law enforcement’s use of lethal 
force. Among these factors are officers’ stress levels,188 biases and individual life 
experiences,189 racial stereotypes,190 mental states,191 gender,192 and perceived 
behaviors of the suspects.193 Racial bias, whether conscious or unconscious, has 
been found particularly influential and endemic in police officers’ choice of 
when to use force and how much force is required.194 Other forms of bias can 
 
 188 Judith Pizarro Andersen et al., Reducing Lethal Force Errors by Modulating Police 
Physiology, 60 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENV’T MED. 867, 867–68 (2018). 
 189 For example, one study noted that the greater the difference in social structures between 
the officer and the citizen, the more likely it is that the suspect will resist the officer and the 
officer will then use excessive or at least a more severe type of force in response. Oftentimes, 
however, perceived differences between officer and citizen are based less on social distinctions 
and more on norms and expectations: the officer thinks of herself or himself as a superior 
protector and the suspect as rebellious. See R.E. Sykes & J.P. Clark, A Theoyr of Deference 
Exchange in Police-Civilian Encounters, 81 AMER. J. SOC. 584 (1975). 
 190 See Sébastien Cojean et al., supra note 21, at 3–4. The literature had varying conclu-
sions on the impact of race and ethnicity. For example, some of the literature found that use 
of force increased when the victim’s appearance reinforced racial and ethnic stereotypes. Neg-
ative cultural perceptions also increased police use of force toward certain ethnic groups. Fur-
ther, minorities were more likely to be subjected to force earlier in the encounter than their 
white counterparts. 
 191 See id. at 3. Police are also influenced by the subject’s mental state. For example, per-
sons with mental disorders are disproportionately likely to experience use of force techniques, 
which can only be partially explained by their increased tendency to be aggressive. Persons 
under the influence of drugs or alcohol are more likely to be subjected to force with an inter-
mediate weapon. Officer’s perceptions of such states influence their perception of the danger-
ousness of the subject, making mentally unstable persons particularly vulnerable to police 
force. 
 192 See Mengyan Dai & Denise Nation, Understanding Non-Coercive, Procedurally Fair 
Behavior by the Police During Encounters, 37 INT’L J. L. CRIME & JUST. 170, 173 (2009) 
(explaining that women were less likely to experience use of force measures by police). 
 193 One study found that the force used by an officer was influenced by the “disrespect” an 
officer perceived an individual to have towards the officer. According to Alpert and Dunham, 
the level of coercion applied by the police officer will increase relative to the degree of the 
threat posed by the citizen to an officer’s authority and not necessarily the officer’s life or 
bodily integrity. See G.P. Alpert et al., Interactive Police-Citizen Encounters that Result in 
Force, 7 POLICE Q. 475 (2004). 
 194 According to a recent sociological study investigating the implicit and explicit bias 
among U.S. police officers, about one in five officers display high levels of unconscious or 
implicit pro-white and anti-Black bias while one in eight officers show explicit or conscious 
pro-white bias. Jomills Braddock et al., How Many Bad Apples? Investigating Implicit and 
Explicit Bias Among Police Officers and the General Public, CONTEXTS (Oct. 27, 2020), 
https://contexts.org/articles/how-many-bad-apples-investigating-implicit-and-explicit-bias-a 
mong-police-officers-and-the-general-public/. Another study from 2012 found that officers 
were quicker to shoot an armed Black target, relative to an armed white target and quicker to 
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press “don’t shoot” for the unarmed white target, relative to the unarmed Black target. See 
POLICYLINK & ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, LIMITING POLICE USE OF FORCE: PROMISING 
COMMUNITY-CENTERED STRATEGIES 1, 7 (2014), https://www.policylink.org/sites/default/file 
s/pl_police_use%20of%20force_111914_a.pdf. Such biases are not exclusive to U.S. police 
officers, and there is mounting evidence of similar patterns in other parts of the world. The 
United Nations Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent found practices of 
racial profiling in the criminal justice systems of both Brazil and Canada. See U.N. Secretary 
General, Preventing and Countering Racial Profiling of People of African Descent: Good 
Practices and Challenges, 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/73/354 (2019), https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un. 
org/files/preventracialprofiling-en.pdf; see also, Ignacio Cano, supra note 177 (showing that 
the ratio of individuals killed versus wounded by the police in Rio de Janeiro is higher for 
Black individuals than white individuals). In France, following the death of Adama Traore, a 
Black Frenchman, while in the custody of French gendarmes officials, the public protested 
and called for the French government to address racism and excessive use of force within the 
police. Paris’s police chief Didier Lallement responded with sympathy for the police officers 
involved in the death of Traore and stated that the Paris police were not racist and did not use 
excessive force. Rokhaya Diallo, France is Still in Denial About Racism and Police Brutality, 
AL JAZEERA (June 11, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/6/11/france-is-still-in 
-denial-about-racism-and-police-brutality/. 
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relate to religious identity, gender, and ethnic stereotypes.195 Officers are also 
influenced by their own idiosyncrasies, such as their personality,196 ethnicity,197 
gender,198 mental capacity,199 and level of education and experience.200 
 
 195 One study found that half of India’s police expressed “anti-Muslim feelings” and be-
lieved that Muslims were inherently more likely to commit crimes. See generally CJ Wer-
leman, How India’s Police Force Are ‘Adopting and Mirroring’ BJP’s Racist and Prejudice 
Beliefs, NEW ARAB (Sept. 4, 2019), https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2019/9/4/hal 
f-of-indias-police-force-express-anti-muslim-bias (citing COMMON CAUSE AND CSDS, 
STATUS OF POLICING IN INDIA REPORT 2019: POLICE ADEQUACY AND WORKING CONDITIONS 
(2019), https://www.commoncause.in/uploadimage/page/Status_of_Policing_in_India_Repor 
t_2019_by_Common_Cause_and_CSDS.pdf). 
 196 While no study has yet been completed comparing the effect of different personalities 
on the decision to use force, studies have shown that a small number of officers are responsible 
for a large number of incidents, which cannot be explained fully by shift hours and patrol area. 
Researchers hypothesize that cognitive ability and emotional regulation both play a role in use 
of force decisions. See generally Steven Brandl & Megan Stroshine, The Role of Officer At-
tributes, Job Characteristics, and Arrest Activity in Explaining Police Use of Force, 25 CRIM. 
JUST. POL’Y REV. 548 (2012); Katelyn Jetelina et al., Dissecting the Complexities of the Rela-
tionship Between Police Officer-Civilian Race/Ethnicity Dyads and Less-than-Lethal Use of 
Force, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1164 (2017). 
 197 At least one study showed that white police officers are more coercive towards Black 
individuals that their Black counterparts. See generally Eugene Paoline et al., Race and the 
Police Use of Force Encounter in the United States, 58 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 54 (2018). 
 198 The gender of the officer also influences the use of coercion. Women officers use less 
force than men and employ force based on different reasoning, with an emphasis on need and 
opportunity. See generally Orville Nickel, Critical Factors in Police Use of Force Decisions, 
WALDEN DISSERTATIONS & DOCTORAL STUDIES, https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/disserta-
tions/1270/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2021). Moreover, while women generally use less force than 
men, they also use it differently. Studies show that they use less empty-hand control than men, 
but they are significantly more likely to use intermediate weapons. See Katelyn Jetelina et al., 
supra note 196. 
 199 Heather Kleider et al., Shooting Behaviour: How Working Memory and Negative Emo-
tionality Influence Police Officer Shoot Decisions, 24 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCH. 707, 708 
(2010). 
 200 Regarding professional experience, experts and experienced police officers adapt better 
to circumstances and possible outcomes than novices, whose reasoning is more sequential and 
linear. This was shown in an analysis of cognitive tasks performed by twelve experienced 
officers (specialized firearm officers, SFO) and eleven novices (authorized firearm officers, 
AFO). Laura Boulton & Jon Cole, Adaptive Flexibility: Examining the Role of Expertise in 
the Decision Making of Authorized Firearms Officers During Armed Confrontation, 10 J. 
COGNITIVE ENG’G & DECISION MAKING 291, 294 (2016). Other researchers also observed con-
siderable differences in the way experts and novices reacted to videos showing police use of 
force; the experts focused on the broader picture, putting “force mitigation” and “back-up op-
portunity” at the top of their word list. They also referred to “verbal command” or “verbal 
direction,” whereas novices frequently referred to “control.” See Laura Mangels et al., Police 
Expertise and Use of Force: Using a Mixed-Methods Approach to Model Expert and Novice 
Use-of-Force Decision-Making, 35 J. POLICE & CRIM. PSYCH. 293, 297–99 (2020). Experts 
thus seem to focus on the event as a whole, and not solely on the aim of controlling the suspect. 
This observation also applies to shooting speed and accuracy. In a study comparing elite 
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The wide-ranging nature of factors that impact police use of force, many of 
which violate basic principle of non-discrimination, underscores the need for 
governments to establish constraints on the permissible use of force through pol-
icy prescriptions grounded in law. Moreover, available research on how police 
behavior is impacted by written directives confirms the need for clear and spe-
cific policies on lethal use of force.201 Policies containing broad, discretionary 
language and lacking in accountability mechanisms have been found to be inef-
fective at cabining police discretion.202 Conversely, clear and specific language, 
accompanied by a robust accountability framework that includes standardized 
use of force reporting and review, is correlated with lower rates of police use of 
force.203 One study concluded that a policy which required an officer to report 
 
members of an Emergency Response Team (ERT) and rookie police officers, the former had 
greater shooting speed, better accuracy, and made fewer mistakes. An eye-tracking device 
revealed that the better performance of the experts could partly be explained by their greater 
use of the “quiet-eye” technique, enabling them to focus longer on the target before shooting. 
Joan Vickers & William Lewinski, Performing Under Pressure: Gaze Control, Decision Mak-
ing and Shooting Performance of Elite and Rookie Police Officers, 31 HUM. MOVEMENT SCI. 
101, 101 (2012). We can also assume that a higher education level, while not affecting the 
number of arrests or searches, may significantly reduce the frequency of the use of coercion. 
Jason Rydberg & William Terrill, The Effect of Higher Education on Police Behavior, 13 
POLICE Q. 92, 92 (2010). 
 201 For example, results showed that U.S. officers working under the most restrictive poli-
cies used force less readily than those who were acting under more discretionary policies. 
William Terrill & Eugene Paoline III, Police Use of Less Lethal Force: Does Administrative 
Policy Matter?, 34 JUST. Q. 193, 193 (2017). 
 202 One study found that “considerable reductions in police shooting and both officer and 
citizen injury and death are associated with the establishment of clearly delineated guidelines 
and procedures for the review of officer shooting discretion.” James Fyfe, Administrative In-
terventions on Police Shooting Discretion: An Empirical Examination, 7 J. CRIM. JUST. 309, 
322 (1979). Others found that an administrative policy can be successful in controlling an 
officer’s decision to use deadly force. See Michael D. White, Controlling Police Decisions to 
Use Deadly Force: Reexamining the Importance of Administrative Policy, 47 CRIME & 
DELINQUENCY 131, 131 (2001). 
 203 One U.S.-centered study found that departments with policies that incorporate a divi-
sion of responsibilities, clear supervisory roles, and a well-established hierarchy are less likely 
to engage in excessive uses of force. Hoon Lee & Michael S. Vaughn, Organizational Factors 
that Contribute to Police Deadly Force Liability, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 193, 202 (2010) (increased 
training, heightened oversight, and administrative policies were correlated with reduced police 
shootings) (citing Concetta Culliver & Robert Sigler, Police Use of Deadly Force in Tennessee 
Following Tennessee v. Garner, 11 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 187, 191–92 (1995)); see also 
Tim Prenzler et al., Reducing Police Use of Force: Case Studies and Prospects, 18 
AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 343, 354 (2013) (“Policies need to be explicit about what is 
required of officers . . . and policies need to be written down, regularly reviewed, and updated 
where appropriate. More generally, an enhanced accountability framework appears to be es-
sential for reducing force.”); Terrill & Paoline, supra note 201, at 210 (“[R]esults show that 
officers working in the agency . . . with the least restrictive, or loosely-coupled policy, were 
more apt to use force.”). 
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every time he aimed his firearm at an individual but did not fire was correlated 
with overall lower rates of shooting deaths.204 Policies that set out external over-
sight bodies have been found to be more effective than those with internal mech-
anisms.205 Further, these external mechanisms have proven most effective when 
they have the power to conduct their own investigations independently from po-
lice departments.206 For these many reasons, putting in place clear use of force 
directives in line with international standards is an important foundation for law 
enforcement to respect and protect human rights. It is, however, important to note 
that such directives cannot stand alone. Use of lethal force directives must be 
accompanied by meaningful implementation,207 viable and available alternatives 
 
 204 Jay T. Jennings & Meghan E. Rubado, Preventing the Use of Deadly Force: The Rela-
tionship Between Police Agency Policies and Rates of Officer-Involved Gun Deaths, 77 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 217, 217 (2017). 
 205 According to the U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS AND CRIME, HANDBOOK ON POLICE 
ACCOUNTABILITY, OVERSIGHT AND INTEGRITY 8 (2011), external civilian oversight of police 
conduct is a “hallmark of a democratic police force” (internal citations omitted). 
 206 2014 UNSR Report, supra note 34, at ¶¶ 83–84. 
 207 While implementation of use of force directives is beyond the scope of this research, 
abundant research exists on how such directives must be socialized and enforced within a 
police department to be effective. First, directives are most effective when they become second 
nature through repeated socialization. See Zachary W. Oberfield, Socialization and Self-Se-
lection: How Police Officers Develop Their Views About Using Force, 44 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 
702, 722–25 (2012). Second, robust internal training on appropriate use of force scenarios 
grounded in the departmental policy strongly influences how officers make decisions to use 
force. See Kelly A. Hine et al., Exploring Police Use of Force Decision-Making Processes 
and Impairments Using a Naturalistic Decision- Making Approach, 45 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 
11, 1782, 1794 (2018). Northern Ireland is another example. Following passage of new legis-
lation requiring government authorities, including the police, to view their obligation to protect 
human rights at the same level as traditional policing duties, police culture around human 
rights shifted “from an approach of ‘control and stop’ to one of facilitation.” INT’L NETWORK 
OF CIVIL LIBERTIES ORG. & THE INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC–UNIV. OF CHI. LAW SCH., 
DEFENDING DISSENT: TOWARDS STATE PRACTICES THAT PROTECT AND PROMOTE THE RIGHTS 
TO PROTEST 7 (2018), https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007 
&context=ihrc. 
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to use of force,208 and effective mechanisms for transparency and accountabil-
ity.209  
Finally, regulation of police use of force through directives and implementa-
tion of these directives, however effective, should not be considered the ultimate 
goal of reform of law enforcement practices. As many advocates and policy mak-
ers have noted, use of force can only truly be minimized by establishing limits to 
police contact in the first instance210 and reducing the common practice of over-
policing, especially of minority and marginalized communities.211   
Globally, use of lethal force directives provide a critical and necessary foun-
dation for cabining police discretion in a human rights-compliant manner. None 
 
 208 Even the most specific, well-constructed, and socialized directives must be accompa-
nied by other measures to ensure compliance. For example, the availability of less coercive 
measures tends to reduce the amount of force used in a given situation, in accordance with the 
international policing principle of de-escalation. See Yu-Sheng Lin & Tonisha R. Jones, Elec-
tronic Control Devices and Use of Force Outcomes: Incidence and Severity of Use of Force, 
and Frequency of Injuries to Arrestees and Police Officers, 33 POLICING: AN INT’L J. 152, 171 
(2010); William Sousa et al., The Impact of TASERs on Police Use-of-Force Decisions: Find-
ings from a Randomized Field-Training Experiment, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 35, 35 
(2010); Bruce Taylor & Daniel J. Woods, Inquiries to Officers and Suspects in Police Use-of-
Force Cases: A Quasi-Experimental Evaluation, 13 POLICE Q. 3 (2010). Additionally, provid-
ing police officers with crisis intervention team (CIT) programs that focus on how to interact 
with individuals in a mental health crisis without resorting to using force have been found 
effective. Implementing CIT training and partnerships between police and mental health ser-
vices will best serve those undergoing mental health crises. Jennifer L.S. Teller, PhD et. al., 
Crisis Intervention Team Training for Police Officers Responding to Mental Disturbance 
Calls, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 232–37 (2006). The use of body cameras can provide a useful 
avenue for monitoring police activity for misconduct and has been successful in some contexts 
in decreasing use of force. For example, in Great Britain, body-worn cameras led to a 50% 
reduction in the use of force, but mostly at the bottom of the force continuum. Darren Henstock 
& Barak Ariel, Testing the Effects of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Use of Force During 
Arrests: A Randomized Controlled Trial in a Large British Police Force, 14 EUR. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 720, 720 (2017). 
 209 Without transparency and accountability in police use of force, a prohibition on arbi-
trary killings is ineffective. See McCann v. United Kingdom, App No. 18984/91, 21 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 97, ¶ 161 (1995). 
 210 Black individuals stopped by the police tend to show signs of nervousness, which in-
creases the likelihood of an officer using force and thereby validating the officer’s racial bias. 
See LIMITING POLICE USE OF FORCE: PROMISING COMMUNITY-CENTERED STRATEGIES, supra 
note 194, at 7–8. 
 211 For example, in Brazil, communities from the lowest socio-economic strata—mostly 
Black communities—are policed more frequently. See Ignacio Cano, supra note 177. In 
France, police often target Black and Arab men and boys when conducting investigatory stops. 
See Abusive Police Stops in France, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 18, 2020), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/06/18/they-talk-us-were-dogs/abusive-police-stops-france. 
Similar over-policing practices of racial minorities are evident in Australia. See Rob White, 
Ethnic Diversity and Differential Policing in Australia: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 10 
J. INT’L MIGRATION & INTEGRATION 359, 359 (2009). 
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of the countries evaluated by our study—which comprises the most well-re-
sourced countries in the world—satisfied this threshold requirement under inter-
national law. For States to guarantee the human rights of their populations, not 
only on paper but also in practice, they must start by instituting a legal and policy 
framework that adequately protects the right to life against law enforcement’s 
power to use force. Establishing such a framework, in conformity with the prin-
ciples set by international law, would be a first step towards living up to their 
fundamental commitments on human rights. 
Figure 9: total grade by city and principle 
 
